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HEINRICH KRONSTEINt AND GERTRUDE LEIGHTON'4
TE political and economic influence of the United States, as ac-
centuated by World War II, emphasizes a national responsibility in
contributing a wise solution to the problem currently presented by
cartels and combines.' The problem involves not only internal eco-
nomic affairs; it is inexorably linked with United States policy towards
the world at large. The proposals,2 therefore, of those who seek to
substitute the English and Continental 3 system of "controlled"
cartels and combines for the present American law, which strictly
prohibits such monopolies, would seem to warrant careful considera-
tion. More particularly, attention should be directed to the precedents
upon which the proposals are based. Since these are mainly European
in origin, it seems fitting at the close of one phase of European economic
life to examine the nature of these precedents and to appraise, with
particular reference to Germany,' the development of one kind of
cartel and combine "control."
A principal source of contention between proponents of prohibition
t Special Attorney, United States Department of Justice, and Profezzor of Law,
Georgetown Law School. The opinions expressed in this article do not necezzarily reflect
the views of the Department of Justice.
tt Formerly Note Editor, Yale Law Journl.
1. Distinguished from a "combine"-which may be defined as an economic entity.
vertical in structure and comprised of corporations, partnerships or other busine2s aslocia-
tions unified in a central authority by various legal devices-the "cartel" has ben deccribed
by Rudolf Callmann:
"A cartel agreement adjusts the business activities of its members-of merchants of a
particular field of industry or trade-to a given market. In particular it adjusts productive
capacity in a given industry to the demands of the market, trying to correct the usual tend-
ency of output capacity to outrun these demands. Such an adjustment among competitor.
limits or eliminates competitive freedom. A cartel is always a horizontal asoeiation; .
I define a cartel as:
a contractual association of legally independent entrepreneurs in the Eame or
similar field of business formed with the intent, effect or potentiality of influencing
the market by means of regulation of competition."
See Hearings before the TNEC on Inrestigation of Concentration of Economic Power, 76th
Cong., 3rd Sess. (1940) pt. 25, 13347 (hereinafter cited as HEAiGs).
2. See NATIONAL FOREIGN TRADE CouNCIL, INC., MAfnORA Ornu ON REGULATORY
MEAsURES AFFECTING A~mERcAN FOREIGN TRADE (1944) passim; Haussmann and Ahearn,
The International Control of Cartels-Past and Fidure (1945) 20 TnouGnT S5; Perlins,
Cartels: What Shall We Do About Them? (1944) 139 HARPER'S 570.
3. See SEAGER AND Gu IC, TRUST AND CoRro.vTion PnOnLE!Is (1929) 663 el sel.;
HEARINGS, passin, especially 13355; Kronstein, The Dynamics of German Cartls and Patents
1 (1942) 9 U. OF Cm. L. REv. 643.
4. The absence of published decisions from Poland and Southeastern Europe gen-
erally, where administrative agencies have functioned pursuant to statutory authority
without sustaining tribunal decisions, has confined much of the material that follows to
German sources. The latter, however, are typical of the European development as a whole.
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and proponents of control is the manner in which the "public interest"
may best be safeguarded. To the latter, the present world economy
seems to have advanced beyond the stage of "free competition," and
"control" appears more practical and realistic than prohibition; for
control, it is urged, may restrain monopolistic abuse while encouraging
industrial concerns in the promotion of activities favorable to the
public interest.
Prohibition, on the other hand, assumes that the public interest is
best served by the preservation of economic freedom and equal bar-
gaining power in contractual relationships. It does not of course ex-
clude the exercise of some control, but it requires that such control as
exists be exercised by a government militant in its efforts to secure a
free market; it requires the abolition of economic institutions which
tend to inhibit, coerce or disrupt the natural balance of free competi-
tion. From this point of view, the claim of proponents of "control"
that the fundamental contract relation is outmoded, appears somewhat
naive. Doubtless a completely unregulated market is a thing of the
past, but there is a difference of no small degree between "control"
for the purpose of maintaining a naturally achieved economic balance,
where individual as well as corporate activity is permitted free ex-
pression, and "control" designed to "make do" existing monopolies by
attempting to purge them of their more aberrant traits.
But even if "control" in the latter and narrower sense were per-
mitted to supersede prohibition, it would seem to require a formulation
of objectives as clear and as definite as the principle of free competition
implicit in prohibition. Once the latter is abandoned the substitute
must be accompanied by a positive statement of public policy. In the
absence of such legislative commitmient, administrative and judicial
agencies I entrusted with control of cartels and combines have too
often found themselves obliged to accept as the criterion of the public
interest what cartels themselves have preordained.
One of the principal reasons for the failure of European control has
been precisely this inability of legislative bodies to arrive at a satisfac-
tory definition of the "public interest"; there has been little statutory
guidance among the conflicting claims of adverse parties. As a result,
the question was repeatedly raised: did the public interest lie with
technologically weak members of a wire cartel I which urged govern-
ment support of the existing price structure, when a break in the
market would have permitted technologically strong members of the
cartel to obtain control of the few remaining firms? Did it lie with the
German coal industry which in 1931 sought to "reform" backward coal
5. Seeinfra p.305 and p. 317.
6. Frankfurter Zeitung, August 6, 1931, p. 3; CALLMANN, DAs DEUTSCHE IARTELL-
RECHT (1934) 473 (hereinafter cited KARTELLRECHT).
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companies by government release of the entire industry from cartel
obligations so as to force such companies out of business, if they failed
to meet the industry's demands? 7 Or was the public interest on the
side of locomotive and railroad car manufacturers in their opposition
to a German government-owmed railroad which urged cartelization of
these supply companies with a view to establishing higher prices by
means of supply quotas? 8 The French and German governments them-
selves were confronted with similar questions in having to decide
whether to support national and international cartel price policies in
respect to potash and phosphate industries, largely French government
property,9 and in respect to the aluminum industry of which the
German government owned 90 percent.' Was it in the public interest
to promote profits through high prices, or by favoring low prices to
assure farmers a supply of cheap fertilizers and manufacturers cheap
light metals? 1 The list may be extended indefinitely, yet it suggests
that once the automatic protection of public interest through the
preservation of contractual equality was removed, agencies of control
.became engulfed in a task of enormous intricacy, a task involving
niceties of distinction which an agency could hardly hope to resolve
without vigoroas legislative assistance.
The basic divergence of these two views of control, centering funda-
mentally in disagreement as to the character of the public interest, as
well as in diametrically opposed methods of securing its preservation,
cannot be too strongly emphasized. Recognition of this dichotomy of
viewpoint is essential to an understanding of the development of
European cartel regulation; it makes particularly significant the dis-
position of "control" proponents to point repeatedly to the exemplary
success of European regulation.' 2 For historical fact would seem to
indicate clearly that the success is only exemplary in terms of a shifting,
irresponsible concept of public welfare.
7. Frankfurter Zeitung, Jan. 25,1931, p. 5, col. 1.
8. Id., Jan. 13, 1931, p.5, col. 1.
9. See statement of the Assistant to the Attorney General in documents attached to
the consent decree in United States v. Deutsche Kalisyndikat Gesellschaft (S. D. N. Y.
1924) In Equity; No. 41-24. See also re phosphates, Bulletin Quotidien, Paris, Dec. 13,1933.
10. LIEFm AN', BETEILIGUNGS UND FINIZIERUNGSGESELLSCIL FTEN; (1931) 357. In
1931, as a further example, the Netherlands government yielded to the prer3ure of the
Philips electrical firm and granted an e.\tension in lamp patents which carried at least three
years beyond the permissible statutory period, but assured Holland a proper share in the
proposed extension of the international electric bulb cartel. See Frankfurter Zeitung,
March 19, 1931, p. 5, col. 3, p. 6, col. 3.
11. Thus it is frequently argued that only by means of cartel agreements in nitrogen,
for e-xample, could I. G. Farbenindustrie have made profits sufficient to support its valuable
research in oil and rubber; that such research was of greater "public interest" to Germany
than the interest of the farmer, a principal nitrogen consumer.
12. NATiONAL FOREIGN TRADE CoUNcIL, INC., op. cit. supra note 2, at III el seg.
1946]
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JUDIcIAL LATITUDE PERMITS DISINTEGRATION OF FREE COMPETITION
The collapse of free enterprise in Europe was due more to the failings
of judicial enforcement than to the weakness of protective legislation.
Legislative action had not been remiss, for the step from the closed
economic systems of the pre-French Revolution period to free competi-
tion was the result of awell-considered adoption of the liberal economic
system." Not inappropriately it was the legislature of Revolutionary
France which first denounced interference in the "natural" balance of
economic forces as a violation of the basic rights of mankind. 14 Later
the Criminal Code of 1810 decreed imprisonment for any one who in-
dividually or in cooperation with others negotiated transactions in
order to obtain profit not resulting from"a free and natural balance of
competition." 1 Notwithstanding these directions, as early as August
29, 1833, the criminal division of the Court of Paris 11 declared valid,
subject to certain conditions, a plan of price-fixing sponsored by a
group of manufacturers. Although the Court found that in periods of
depression the protection of industry was of superior importance to
the protection of the liberal economy, the decision remained an excep-
tion until 1891, when the civil division of the Court of Paris first con-
strued the Criminal Code as admitting a distinction between "good"
and "bad" cartels: no objection to the cartel was allowed if its goal was
"the defense of the common interests" of the people engaged in an in-
dustry.'7 The new doctrine gained recognition rapidly.' By 1911 the
Cour de Cassation had adopted it, with minor modifications; the test of
a "good" cartel now depended upon whether a "normal" price was sus-
tained and whether this resulted in "normal" as opposed to "excessive"
13. See BoEHm, WETTBEWERB UND MONOPOLKAiIPF (1933) 319 el seq., especially 329.
It should be mentioned that the author of this distinguished book, Franz Boehm, continued
his efforts against monopoly in Germany even under the Nazi regime, for which activity le
was excluded from office and deprived of income. Today he is Rector of the University of
Freiburg, where he is joined by a number of courageous liberals, such as Eucken, Dietle, and
Lampe.
14. Law of June 14, 1791 (Loi Chapelier), 3 Lois ET AcTES DU GOUVERNEMENT 274
(1835); see TCaERNOFF, ENTENTES RCONOMIQUES ET FINANCIARES: CARTELS, SYNDICATS,
TRUSTS, HOLDINGS (1933) 358.
15. CODE PANAL (1810) art. 419. This provision remained in force until September 3,
1926. See MAZEAUD, LE RGIME JURIDIQUE DES ENTENTES INDUSTRIELLES ET CO 1MER-
ciALES EN FRANCE (1928) 83 et seg., especially 84. Garraud, L'Etat acluel de la Mgislatiots el
de la jurisprudencefranraises relatives a l'accaparement, a la spiculation illicite el aux coalitions
(France, 1924) BULLETIN DE LA SOCIATA DE LPGISLATION COMPAIE 344.
16. Cour de Paris, August 29, 1833, digested in Industrie el Commerce, § 424 and note,
27 DALLOZ, RPERTOIRE MATHODIQUE (1845) 791.
17. Cour de Paris, April 14, 1891 [1893] RECUEiL PERIODIQUE DE JURISPRUDENCE
(Dalloz) II, 70-1.
18. See e.g. Cour de Grenoble, May 1, 1894, [1895] RECUEIL P.RIODIQUE DE JURiS-
PRUDENCE (Dalloz) II, 221; Cour de Bordeaux, Jan. 2, 1900, [1901] id. II, 150, aff'g Trib.
Comm., P&igueux, June 2, 1899.
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profit.1 9 The seemingly slight shift in this decision from "natural" price
to "normal" price does not fail to betray, however, the fundamental
regression from one attitude to another; from an economic system
which assumes an objective standard capable of enforcement by the
courts, to a system based upon a subjective standard derived from
declarations of businessmen as to the reasonableness of their profits.
As if unaware of the far-reaching effect of this development, the French
legislature ratified on December 3, 1926, what the courts had already
accomplished. 2
In Central and Southeastern Europe events showed a similar de-
velopment. Despite legislative prohibition 21 against business agree-
ments tending to raise prices to public disadvantage, -2 the courts of the
several Balkan countries dominated by Austrian law refused or were
unable to curb the eoxpansion of cartel agreements. By 1902 over fifty
cartels of national importance were already functioning actively in
Austria.23 The Austrian courts continually interpreted prohibitive
statutes, admittedly designed to protect free competition, as rendering
such agreements not void but unenforceable. -4 And since courts would
not therefore entertain suits, parties to agreements were enabled to
achieve their purposes without court supervision or interference. Thus
only dissatisfied parties willing to risk complete loss of their cartel
19. Chambre des Requites de la Cour de Casation, Decision of ,May 3, 1911, [1912]
RECUEIL PARIODIQUE DE JURISPRUDENCE (Dalloz) I, 33; see also previous decision of
Tribunal de Commerce de Saint-Etienne, April 11, 1911, (France, Nov. 2, 1911) 12 G.Q-zun=
JUDICIAIRE ET CO=IIRCLE DE LYON.
20. This was brought about through amendment of the Criminal Code. See MAIZAu,
op. cit. supra note 15, at 91.
21. During the period prior to World War I.
22. For the principal provisions see § 4 of the Austrian statute dealing with "coali-
tions," where "any understanding between merchants, the purpose of which is to increaze
prices of . . . merchandise to the disadvantage of the public" was declared unenforceable.
Law of April 7, 1870, [1870] REICHSGESETZBLATT, No. 43. On Czechoslomakian law generally,
see HEXNER, GRUNDLAGEN DES TSCHIECHOSLOWAKISCREN KAnTELLRECUTzS (1929) 63. Se
also Menzel, Die wirtschaftliclteiz Karelle und die Rczhtsordnung (Deutschland, 1895) 61
SCHR.IFEN DES VEREINS FUER SocLALrOLnrri 23; Weiss-Wellenstein, Adendmng iind Verer-
heitielsung der Kartellgesefzgebung (Deutschland, 1928) 1 VEPHANDLUNGEN DES FUENFUD-
DrEISSIGSTEN DEUTScHEN JURISTENTAGES 181; Landesberger, Wdche Massregeln cmrfelcTk
sich fuer die rechtliclze Behandlung der Industrie Karldle? [1902] 2 VERIANDLtrriGEN DES
sEcasuNDZWANZIGsTEN DEUTSCEEN JURISTENTAGES 294.
23. For a discussion of the development of Austrian cartels see Wei-szWellenstcla mipa
note 22.
24. See Klein, [1902] 3 VERHNDLUNGEN DES SECHSUNDZW,?uzIGs"EN DEUcrscan
JURmsTENTAGEs 299. One of the earliest of the decisions, however, actually voided a cartel
agreement: the Austrian electric light bulb cartel was adjudged without effect on the ground
that since the poorer classes of society could scarcely afford the lowest prices established by
free enterprise, artificial price elevation above that level could only result in harm to the
public generally. See Decision of September 26, 1905, No. 10537, (1916) 8 (NEun FOLGr-)
S MUNG VON ZIVILREcHTLIcHEN ENTSCHEIDUNGEN DES OBEnsmn GErIcnrsrio~z-s
No. 3163.
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connections attempted to litigate in their own protection, a step soon
found so regrettable in the face of ensuing boycott by cartel members 26
that between 1878 and 1938 only eight cases involving cartels were
brought into the highest court of Austria. In 1916 the court declared 21
that the question of harm arising from increased prices would not be
considered, since in its opinion the cartel price:
". .. saved an important branch of the Austrian industry whose
existence otherwise would have been threatened in a time of eco-
nomic emergency. Nothing could be more advantageous to the
public than the saving of an industry. Any individual disadvantage
due to an increase in price would be off-set by removing from the
cartel any illegality which might result from a price increase or
from any inconsistency with good ethics."
In Germany the basic economic statute, the Gewerbeordnung of
June 21, 1869, 28 provided: "All trade is open to everyone, unless this
statute provides exceptions from or limitations upon this rule." 29 The
Reichsgericht decision of February 4, 1897,30 however, adroitly de-
prived this declaration of its substance, and further entrenched the
doctrine of "good cartels." 1' The case involved an action for specific
performance of a cartel agreement; the cartel management representing
a Saxonian wood pulp producers' association, sought to hold a member
to the purposes of the organization, which were "to prevent harmful
competition among manufacturers and to obtain reasonable prices." 32
The opinion of the Reichsgericht expressed views familiar to American
cartel proponents:
"If in any industrial field prices decrease to such an extent that
the existence of a profitable industry is endangered, public welfare
itself is in issue. . . , In its interest unreasonably low prices
should be avoided. . . .Often the legislature itself tries to increase
25. Arbitration was the chief means by which such boycotts were made effective. See
Kronstein, Business Arbitration-Instrument of Private Government (1944) 54 YAL, L. J. 36,
42-4.
26. Decision of March 28, 1916. [1916] JURISTIscin BLkATER 225,
27. Ibid.
28. [1869-70] BUNDESGESETZBLATT 245.
29. Section 1 of the Gewerbeordnung.
30. (1897) 38 ENTSCIEIDUNGEN DES REICHSGERICHTS IN ZIVILSACtuEN (hereinafter
cited R. G. Z.) 155.
31. The development in Germany appears to have been largely the same as in other
countries, despite the common view that German cartels were originally government-
sponsored. See BomEm, WETTBEWERB UND MoNoPOLmAmPF (1933) 197, 317. Boehm's
contributions to the whole problem of monopoly have been considerable. Dr. Kronsteln is
indebted to him for many ideas growing out of personal discussion of these questions, For
German cartel law in general see KARTELLaECHT, passim.
32. Seesupra note30.
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certain prices by protective tariffs or otherwise. It cannot therefore
be contrary to public interest to permit ovners of enterprises en-
gaged in the same kind of business to combine for the purpose of
preventing underselling and the decrease in prices resulting there-
from. This type of combination in self-defense is justified." 33
Thus, by disregarding legislative prohibition of cartels and monop-
olistic combines on the one hand, and by espousing the "good cartel"
doctrine on the other, European courts in general soon found them-
selves in the position of having to deal as "control" agencies with much
more involved problems than would have faced them under the legisla-
tive prohibitive system they had so successfully undermined.
THE INTRODUCTION OF "CONTROL"
Like the sorcerer's apprentice, courts had set in motion more than
they knew how or had the power to stop. They were not endowed
with the capacities of administrative agencies; the rules of procedure
did not permit them to explore facts for themselves. As a result, it soon
became apparent that they were forced to acquiesce to the able briefs
of cartel lawyers, against which the less powerful and less well repre-
sented individual could scarcely prevail. Nor were the courts successful
in preventing cartels and combines from applying to their own ad-
vantage legal devices originally designed for quite different purposes.
Both the abuse of patent and trade-mark monopoly 31 and the trans-
formation of the meaning of "fairness" in business relations 35 are well
known." As a result, the position of monopolies improved; with the
accumulation of decisions favorable to them, they came to possess that
solidity which custom attaches to institutions by reason of their long
and stable existence.
33. (1897) 38 R. G. Z. 155, 157. The court also posed the following questions: "Does
an association of the character of the plaintiff violate the principles of commercial freedom
enunciated by the Gewerbeordnung? Does an association of merchants, by fixing minimum
prices interfere with the legislative aim in guaranteeing commercial freedom in the interest
of public welfare? Do contracts of the kind in issue illegally restrict the freedom of the
individual?" Id. at 156.
34. See HAmI-TON, TNEC REP., PATENTS .=D FREE ENTERPRISE, Monograph 31
(1941) passirn; Diggins, Trade-21arks and Restraints of Trade (1944) 32 GEo. L. J. 113.
35. HEARINGs at 13351-2. For discussion of misuse of the concept "unfair competi-
tion" see Cauauarr, THE LAw oF UsrrAsm CouPrnoN,&m TrnDn- sn~ (1945).
36. In connection with shifts in original meanings and misuse of legal devices, attention
should be called to the manner in which the old-fashioned German Vcrein or association,
intended as a simple organization such as a Singrerein (Glee club), Turnrerein (Gym assoia-
tion) or other social club, was developed into a highly useful instrumentality by cartels and
combines. A similar evolution affected the small businessman's Gesdlschaftrn nit lesckrack-
ter Haftung (G.m.b.H.), or limited liability association, a type of business organization eztab-
lished by the statute of April 20, 1892 (Gesetz betr. die GeselLkchaften mit beschraenkter
Haftung). See RENNER, Dm RECHTSINSTITUTE DES PRIVATRECaTS UND HP SOMU.
FumNKbo (1929) passimz.
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As early as the beginning of the century the Austrian and German
legislatures, and later the Parliament of Norway, 31 sensing this course
of events, appointed Rnqugtes, or committees of investigation, to deter-
mine how responsible control or prohibition of cartels might be re-
established." These investigations did not result, however, in the
resumption of a policy of prohibition, but in the establishment of ad-
ministrative "control" agencies which were to supplement what little
there was of existing judicial "control." So it was on November 2,
1923, 31 that the German legislature created the first of the several
European administrative agencies, authorizing it to regulate through
licensing, membership control, and threat of dissolution, the activities
and commercial relations of cartels and combines. An official state-
ment accompanying the decree 10 declared:
"There is a national interest in the re-establishment of freedom
of the market, in opposing artificial restriction of production, ex-
cessive rates for alleged risks and excessive prices not justified by
actual costs; there is a national interest in forcing producers and
traders to rediscover their consciousness of duty toward the
public." 41
Administrative control was divided between control offices and
tribunals: the Reichswirtschaftsminister and the Kartellgericht (later
the Reichswirtschaftsgericht) 42 in Germany, and the Control Office and
Control Council in Norway. These offices and tribunals belonged to the
executive department of government, 43 and in that position were sub-
37. The Norwegian commission on cartels was established by the statute of December
29, 1916, and the final report issued in 1922. See Tschierschky, Norwegischer Entwurf Zu
einem Gesetz ueber die Kontrolle von Zusammenschiuessen, Monopolunternehmungen, U. s. IV.
(Deutschland, 1923) 21 KARTLL-RuNDscHAu 78.
38. KONTRADIXTORISCHE VERITANDLUNGEN UEBER DEUTScHE KIARTELLr (1903-1905);
VERHANDLUNGEN DER OESSTERREICmSCsEN KARTELL ENQUETE (1912).
39. See Verordnung gegen Missbrauch wirtschaftlicher Machtstellungen, Nov. 2, 1923
(Kartell Verordnung) [1923] REICHSGESETZBLATT 1, 1067 (Hereinafter cited as XARTELL
VERORDNUNG). The Kartell Verordnung was subsequently amended by the Decree of June
14, 1932, (1932] REICHSGETZBLATT I, 289, and by the statute relating to the change of the
Cartel Decree, July 15, 1933 [1933] REicHSGESETZBLATT 1, 487.
40. See KARTELLRECnT 673 el sec. During the period immediately prior to the rise of
dictatorships in Europe the distinction between rules of law enacted by executive and legisla-
tive power gradually disappeared. "Decree," therefore, is used throughout as meaning
either of these types of enactments, but is not to be confused with the decisions of a court.
41. Ibid.
42. After 1938, the Kartellgericht was replaced by the Reichswirtschaftsgericht.
Throughout this article the term "Cartel Court" is used to signify the German control
tribunal generally, whether the Kartellgericht or Reichswirtschaftsgericht.
43. See Germany: KARTELL VERORDNUNG, § 11, supra note 39. Norway: Statute of
March 12, 1926. See Thagaard, Norwegisches Gesetz belreffend Kontrolle von Konkuren-
zeinschraenkungen und Preismissbrauch (1926) 24 KARTELL RUNDSCHAU 133.
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stantially strengthened by the sharp distinction between public law,
governing relations between individuals and the government, and
private law, governing the interrelations of individuals or business
entities. Original jurisdiction of ordinary courts in no circumstances
extended to questions of public law, except in criminal cases, thus
leaving a wide area in which administrative agencies could function
without judicial interference. And since judicial review of matters
determined by the executive side of government, was limited to ques-
tions of jurisdiction, or legality of a statute, and to circumstances where
such review was specifically authorized, 44 the ordinary courts were
bound to accept administrative determinations as conclusive.45
"CONTROL" THROUGH ADmINISTATIvmE AGENCIES
In granting these wide powers to administrative bodies, European
legislatures were generally compelled to determine precisely what kind
of monopolistic activity was to be regulated: the types of organizations
and the types of transactions; and moreover what aims were to be
accomplished by such regulation.46 In defining regulatory limits, the
problem in draftsmanship was not lessened by the adaptable character
of combines and cartels. Yet despite these difficulties several statutes
show considerable agreement in the definition of cartels to be con-
trolled. In Germany the latter were termed "contracts which establish
obligations relating to production or marketing, conditions of delivery,
methods of price-fixing," 41 while according to Yugoslavian law "con-
tracts, agreements and understandings between different enterprises or
persons active within the same commercial fields" were included where
44. In a case decided June 14, 1932 the Reichsgericht refused to review an administra-
tive decision which, pursuant to statutory authority, ordered an individual to join a coal
cartel. The Court stated that courts could not review the legality of measures of this hind;
that they had always held that governmental acts were subject to review only within a
limited scope and only if the statute itself provided that the measure could be reviewed.
That was not found to be the case here. All that could be e,mmined, the decision continued,
was whether the administrative agency had jurisdiction over a specific act in the field in
which the agency was effective, and whether the character of the measure was lawful in any
case. [1932] 30 KARTELL-RuNDscuAU 565, 56S.
45. Influenced by Otto layer's DEUTSCaES VERWALTUNGSnECUT (1895), the courts
interpreted Section 13 of the Gerichtsverfassungsgesetz of Jan. 27, 1877, [1877] REmcus-
GESETZBLATr 41, to mean that the courts may not interfere with any decision of admis-
trative agencies unless arbitrary action is in issue. See KARITELRECHT at 234. Section 13
reads: "The ordinary courts have jurisdiction over all litigation of private and commercial
character which is not expressly made subject to the jurisdiction of administrative agencies
or administrative tribunals or of any special court." 118771 REicnSGErEnZBaTT at 43. For
discussion see LASssAR, DER ERSTATTUNGSANSPRUCH IM VERWA LTUGS-1IfND FlNANZMRCaT
(1921) 61 et seg.
46. See Ripert, Rapport pr&eng au vom de 1a Comrission des Elnte s conomiriuzs
(France, 1932) 28 BULLETIN DE LA SOCtLfrr D'tTuDES LGILATIEs 253 el sqe.
47. KARTELLVERoRDNuNG, § 1. Seesupranote39.
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"their purpose is to restrict, hinder or exclude the right to compete in
production and marketing of products or . . . determine conditions
of business or prices or rates." 41 But prior to World War II no agree-
ment had yet been reached as to whether an actual rise in market price
was a requisite feature of cartel activity, or whether the mere agreement
to co6perate to that end sufficed to fulfill the statutory definition.
The scope of combines proved more difficult to encompass and the
statutes are correspondingly diverse. On the one hand, Norwegian law
subjected to control "industrialists who by virtue of their activities
substantially influence price of goods or services in the Noxwegian
market . . . and/or industrialists who are owners . . . of concerns
* . . under the decisive influence of a foreign enterprise or subject to a
combination of foreign enterprises, provided that these affect sub-
stantially the prices of essential merchandise or services in one or sev-
eral countries." 4 German law, on the other hand, based its regulation
less on the structure of organization than upon the monopolistic ac-
tivity:
"Whenever conditions of delivery or the method of price fixing
[applied by] enterprises (trusts, communities of interest, syndicates,
cartels, conventions, or similar combinations) . . . endanger
public welfare and public economy because the latter exploit an
economically dominating position, the Cartel Court on motion of
the Secretary of Commerce may permit any party to a contract
who suffers from such dominance by his contractee to withdraw
from all contracts based on such conditions." 0
As to the social purposes or aims which these definitions were de-
signed to implement, the statutes usually contain only very general
principles of "public welfare," 11 or "competition," 12 or seek to "meet
48. Section 2, Par. 1, Decree of August 3, 1934 [1934] A.Z. No. 190. (In German litera-
ture the Yugoslavian statute collection is customarily cited A.Z. The full Yugoslavian title
is Sslizbene Novine, Gakoni. Ed.) This decree was authorized by Sec. 63 of the financial
statute for the year 1934-5, and purported to ". . . clarify and . . . ease the economic con-
ditions of the country." [1934] A.Z. No. 73, XVIII-168, p. 330. See Bilimovit, Das Karkil.
recht Jugoslawiens (Deutschland, 1936) 3 ZEITSCHRIFT FUER OSTEUROPAEISCHES RECIUT 67.
Under Norwegian law a cartel is an "understanding or cooperation of industrialists to
regulate price, pro'duction or market conditions by formal or informal provisions provided
such regulation affects the domestic market conditions; second, any agreement or any regu-
lation having the purpose or effect in accordance with the above." Section 6, (1) and (2) of
the Statute Concerning the Control of Limitation of Combinations and Abuses in Fixing of
Prices, March 12, 1926. See Thagaard, Norwegisches Gesetz beireffend Konlrolle von Kots-
kurrezzeinschraenkungen und .Preismissbrauclt (1926) 24 KARTELL-RuNDSCHAV 133.
49. Section 6, (3) and (4), Statute of March 12, 1926, (1926) 24 KARTELL-RUNDSCUtAU,
133, 134-5.
50. KARTELL VERORDNUNG, § 10, see supra note 39.
51. KARTELL VERORDNUNG, § 4, see supra note 39.
52. Norway:Statute of March 12, 1926, § 1. See Thagaard, supra note 48, at 133.
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abuse in the fixing of prices." 11 The path of administrative bodies was
thus a precarious one; an analysis of their decisions involving regulatory
devices seems to indicate that as the latter developed they generally
failed to fulfill the declared legislative intent to re-establish "freedom
of the market" and to resist "artificial restriction of production." 61
Licensing Power .5 Upon the theory that neither industry nor busi-
ness may profitably run the risk of criminal prosecution, or the risk of
having declared void its operational trade schemes, and at the same
time seeking to afford some protection. to the individual, licensing has
proved one of the most widely used regulatory devices. But though the
fundamental purpose of the device is permissive (the sanction of cartel
activity within limits), only in one instance did a legislature go so far
as to grant full and exclusive power to a licensing authority to dis-
tinguish between legal and illegal cartel activities. Under a statute
which generally prohibited cartels, the Yugoslavian Secretary of Com-
merce and Industry was permitted to determine at what point the
"needs of production or trade" 11 justified the existence of a cartel.
Within this margin of tolerance cartels existing before the enactment
of the statute in 1934 continued unrestricted and hardly disturbed.
By an amendment of November 25, 1935, the combination of prohibi-
tion and discretionary licensing was replaced by a system in which the
legality of a cartel rested not with the judgment of an official, but upon
strict compliance with statutory registration requirements 7 Whether
this worked a more effective control is left unanswered by official pub-
lications during 1934-35, but the change would seem to indicate that
after the experience of a single year discretionary sanction proved un-
workable. Abandonment was at least significant.
Licensing authority in Norway, on the other hand, suffered not so
53. Id. § 1, at 137-9.
54. Seesuprap. 304.
55. The analysis which follows deals exclusively with the attempted control of cartels.
European experience has seen even less concrete effort in the control of single combines,
despite the basic provision of the German Corporation Law, which has been copied in almost
all Continental statutes: "Whenever a corporation endangers public welfare by the behavior
of its management, violations of law or the principles of responsible leadership in butinezs or
otherwise, the Reichsuirtschaftsgericht on motion of the Reichsirt-schaftsminister may
dissolve the corporation." Corporation law of February 4, 1937, § 238(1) [1937 Rnzcns-
GESETZBLATT I, 163.
56. See Section 1, Par. 1, Decree of August 3, 1934 [1934] A.Z. 1934 No. 190, which
provides in full: "Cartels are prohibited. The Secretary of Commerce and Industry, how-
ever, after consultation with the council of ministers, may permit the establishment of
cartels provided public interest under particular economic conditions justified their eist-
ence. Such conditions may be found in needs of production or trade or in needs for a stabili-
zation of business conditions, prices and rates." See Bilimovh , supranote48.
57. See von Sladovi6, Das Karellrecld in Jugoslawien (1936) 3 ZErrszcunxrT DiER AAD-
EME FuER Dnurscnms RrcnT 669, especially at 671.
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much from excessive discretionary power as from a statute which
allowed industrial and manufacturing firms an easy means of evasion.
Since the law required licenses only where the duration of contracts
and agreements exceeded one year,5" it was inevitable that contracts
contemplated "formal" termination within the statutory period, yet
actually extended over a much longer term. That this proved a work-
able arrangement was due to the self-perpetuating nature of firmly
established cartels. Continued operation independent of formal agree-
ment was particularly successful where contact with the customer
could be sustained indirectly through sales agencies and other organi-
zations. It is understandable therefore that the majority of Norwegian
Control Council cases have had to do, not with large industrial con-
cerns, but with cartels of milk traders. For milk producers are rarely
without customers, and since easy access to the latter tends to weaken
dependence on cartel connections, milk cartels could only retain their
members by binding them to formal agreements beyond the statutory
year.
The single industrial case to come before the Norwegian Control
Council, however, illustrates the type of international complication
to which the licensing system may lead. The Norwegian firm, Norsk
Hydro Elektriske Knadelstofaktiesalskab, applied for a license to adopt
a nitrogen agreement entered into with I. G. Farbenindustrie. 9 A
sharp decline in Norwegian exports of nitrate fertilizers had resulted
from the introduction by I. G. Farbenindustrie of a superior method of
procuring nitrogen from the air. These circumstances, it was claimed,
necessitated an agreement, drawn up in 1927, which provided for an
exchange of shares and information, a release to Norsk Hydro of the
technological discoveries, made by the German firm, and for co6rdina-
tion of sales organizations."0 Recognizing its responsibility in shaping
the relations of the Norwegian concern with an enterprise the size of
I. G. Farbenindustrie, the Control Council undertook to preserve the
prestige and power of Norsk Hydro within the framework of the cartel. 1
Among the several changes proposed, and ultimately accepted by
I. G. Farbenindustrie, was the allotment of a higher production quota
to the Norwegian firm.
In approving such an agreement, the Council had to determine, as
had the licensing bodies of other countries, the suitableness of these
private market regulations, and to anticipate the moves, successes, or
failures of foreign business concerns with which the domestic firm
must now cobperate; it had to note what prices, production quantities,
58. Statute of March 12, 1926, § 16; see Thagaard, supra note 48, at 137.
59. See First Report on Effectiveness of Norwegian Cartel and Trust Legislation;
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market distributions, were commensurate with the good of the nation
as a whole. Yet in the performance of this duty the Council was with-
out an objective standard; and who could say in the light of this that
the Council had erred in attaching the fortunes of Norsk Hydro to the
vast nitrogen resources of the German company, instead of considering
more critically the benefits of such an agreement to the Norwegian
farmer? 0
Doubtless the international aspect of the situation was responsible
in part for the readiness of the Control Council to approve the applica-
tion. Having once acquiesced to the purposes of the private company,
it was but a short step for the Council to assume the defense of Nor-
wegian private interests in the conffict of world industry. - Moreover a
government, through its control agency, could hardly be expected to
resist the temptation to exploit the political advantage of such inter-
national connections. Ironically enough, in this instance the German
political maneuvers in industrial guise won out in the end, and I. G.
Farbenindustrie at length secured in Norway itself the very plants-
and production quotas-it had conceded to Norsk Hydro.
In a more restricted capacity, licensing also served to inhibit specific
cartel rules and regulations. Section 9 of the German Cartel decree
of 1923,63 for example, requires a license wherever a cartel directs,
for the purpose of a general boycott, the exclusion of any individual
or corporate entity from the business, or the severing of his or its
connection with a necessary source of supply. Until shortly after
1927 the Cartel Court,64 adhering to the cartel decree of 1923, refused
licenses wherever a cartel rule could be made to serve monopolistic
purposes. The now classical decision of February 17, 1927 cl denying
a license to the Stahlwerksverband, which had sought to boycott a
concern for refusal to join the cartel, illustrates the vigor -ith which
the decree was at first upheld:
"The individual trader is no longer able to act in the interest of
consumers through effecting price changes. This trend leads
finally to monopoly and to dangerous conditions where consumers'
62. According to private information from leading cartel members, at the request of
French nitrogen producers, the French government required nitrogen importation licences
solely for the purpose of strengthening the position of French firms in international cartel
negotiations; the German government, instigated by I. G. Farbenindustrie, threatened a
100 per cent increase in German tariffs on nitrogen in order to preserve the international
cartel created to further I. G. Farbenindustrie's nitrogen interests.
63. See KARTELL VERORDNUNG, supra note 39. See also Norwegian Statute of March
12, 1926, § 21, par. 2, cited supra note 43.
64. The Reichsmirtschaftsminister was in fact the licensing authority, but from hia
decision appeal could be taken to the full Cartel Court. See KInTrw VEROD ,MUG, § 9,
supra note 39.
65. See (1927) 32 DEUrSCaE JURISTEN ZErrUNG 724.
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interests are unprotected against price dictatorships of producers.
The fact that almost all iron merchants have accepted the rules of
the organization [Stahlwerksverband] is no argument in favor of
these conditions, since there can be no doubt that many whole-
salers have joined the organization only because they faced the
overwhelming power of the Stahlwerksverband whose economic
retaliation they feared." 11
But the substance of later decisions of the same court is very differ-
ent. The trend appeared to be in the direction characteristic of the
ordinary civil court ,67 and with the same result: the longer the concept
of the "good" cartel prevailed the more often the Cartel Court came to
support the contentions qf the cartel as against customer and consumer.
In a comparatively recent instance,6s the Reichswirtschaftsminister
granted a license permitting the licensee to boycott a non-cartel mem-
ber who had resisted pressure to join the licensee-cartel. This stand
was taken on the basis of a 1935 Cartel Court decision which had
declared a cartel must be free to exercise all necessary pressure when-
ever non-cartel members, after suitable invitation, refused to join a
cartel.69 Enforced membership was even further encouraged by issuance
of conditional boycott licenses, which provided specified periods of
time within which "offenders" might join voluntarily. The underlying
theory was simply that the commercially weaker members of a cartel
could not afford the drop in price which vvould result if efficient and
commercially strong firms remained outside the cartel organization. 70
There would appear to be, therefore, little doubt that the Cartel Court
submitted to various pressures of commercial groups, nor that by
degrees the licensing device, originally conceived as a weapon against
cartels, at length became a weapon in the hands of the cartels them-
selves.
It may well be argued, however, that the general reversal of the
Cartel Court's policy was not a wholly typical outcome of a system of
administrative "control," but was due to the special influence of Ger-
man National Socialism, which sought to exploit established cartel
power. Admittedly the political philosophy of totalitarianism was a
contributing factor, but that philosophy seems to have come into its
66. Id. at 726.
67. See infra section on Judicial "Control."
68. Decision of August 14, 1940, (1940) 38 KARTELL-RUNDSCHAU 339.
69. Decision of March 5, 1935, (Germany, May 15, 1935) 12 ENTSCHEIDUNGEN UND
GUTACHTEN DES IARTELLGERCHTS (hereinafter cited E. UND G.) Decision No, 299.
70. Boycotts were not only instrumental in compelling outsiders to join cartels but
also in preventing members from cancelling their cartel membership. In 1936 a boycott
license was granted upon the withdrawal of a member, on the ground that the cartel had
asked nothing unreasonable of the member, who could rightfully be expected to return.
Decision of November 17, 1936, (1937) 35 KARTELL-RuNDsCHAU 30.
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full power after administrative agencies had begun to acquiesce to the
pressure of "good" cartels.7 ' The political phase of cartel activity, as
already indicated,7 2 was the last phase rather than the first; resultant
rather than causative. Moreover, the comparable rise of strong or-
ganizations having a deleterious effect on "control" agencies in Switzer-
land 73 can hardly be traceable to German political philosophy.
Nevertheless, a startling example of political manipulation of licens-
ing is exhibited by German decisions involving the right of German
cartels to boycott coperative associations. Disputes arose in con-
nection with the claim of the cooperatives that they were entitled
to resell their products exclusively to their own nembers or to re-
tailers associated with them, and were not required to permit German
producers to encroach on this trade. 4 The last of the cases, arising in
October 1938,75 involved a craftsmen's co~perative which customarily
purchased all supply materials for each member. Upon solicitation by
the coperative the German cartel refused to sell, and sought instead a
boycott license from the ReichswirtschaftsmiMister on the ground that
such a coperative proved injurious to other wholesalers with whom
the cartel management desired to remain on good terms. In the opinion
of the Cartel Court, to which the case was referred, the contention of
the cartel was not well-founded. With exceptional foresight, judgment
was rendered in favor of the defendant upon the ground that Section 9 7
was intended to protect "genuine competition against the abuse of
private power." 7 But the full significance of the decision became only
too apparent in the light of subsequent developments. For as part of a
policy of establishing a cartel of even larger proportions, comprising
both wholesalers and the coperatives themselves, the German govern-
ment through its administrative agency encouraged the activities of
the coperatives, as long as they did not in actual fact compete with
wholesalers. In the event that they did so, in Nonvay as well as in
71. See Decision of Cartel Court, March 5, 1935, supra note 69; Xorsh Hydra cace,
supra note 59; Decision of the Court of Paris, supra note 17. Compare also ca-c3 cited irfra
notes 87 and 88; see Kronstein, The Dynamics of German Cartels and Patents 1 (1942) 9 U. OF
Cm. L. Rav. 643.
72. See discussion of Norwegian Control Council and the Norsk-Hydro case, supra
p. 308.
73. See infra pp. 323-4 the Swiss decisions of February 12, 1936, Schweiger-Hauser
gegen Schweiz. Tabakverband, [1936] ENTrScHEmITTNGEx DES ScM zEruScHmE BuNDEs-
GERIcETs (hereinafter cited B. G. E.) II, 97, and of October 6, 1936, Berner Schachtell'ae-
fabrik, A. G. und Fromagerie Le Castel, S. A. gegen SchweizeriEche Kai-eunion, [1936]
B. G. E. II, 276.
74. See KARTELLRECHT at 405 el seg.; for discussion of German cooperatives ree
GiERXE, DAs DEUTScHE GENOSSENSCHAFTSREcHT, (1913).
75. Decision of October 31, 1938, (1939) 37 KARTELL-RMMSCIIATu 21.
76. KARTELL VEROMDUNG, supra note 39.
77. (1939) 37 KARTL-RuDsc AU at 27.
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Germany,7 they then became subject to discrimination through the
licensed boycott. 9
Somewhat removed from the field of market regulation was the
custom of permitting cartel members to utilize licensing as a means of
mutual blackmail. In a controversy between Lorenz, A. G.,11 together
with the Philips Company of Eindhoven, and Telefunken A. G. (con-
trolled by A. E. G.8' and Siemens), a cartel arbitration tribunal had
ruled that by the provision of the cartel agreement between these
opposing groups, the Philips (Eindhoven) group could not supply radio
material and equipment to Philips, G. m. b. H., a German subsidiary of
the Netherlands firm.82 Upon the petition of Philips (Eindhoven) and
associates, the Cartel Court declared that such an arbitral decision
amounted to a boycott of Philips, G. m. b. H., and that if the German
concerns led by Telefunken A. G., insisted upon its terms, they would
be required to secure a license in accordance with Section 9.83 But
within a few days of this decision, not unexpectedly, a new cartel
agreement appears to have been drawn up between the major parties. 4
Thus the Philips (Eindhoven) group was permitted to expand and
improve its position within the cartel structure at the expense of the
licensing system.
The principles enunciated in the Stahlwerksverband case could not
withstand repeated contrary rulings of this type. Nor could they stem
the rapidity with which cartel organizations, supposedly curbed and
controlled, gained a position of pre~minence, whence they could impose
their own code of business on commercial transactions generally. Once
the power to regulate market conditions was assured, it was within
their means to prescribe who had qualifications to do business and who
had not.85 They could determine the business experience prerequisite
78. See (Germany, 1930) 7 E. UND G. Decision No. 130. (March 30, 1930). For discus-
sion compare KARTELLRECHT 383 et seg.
79. Licensing was also used to keep out foreign competition. See American.British
Tobacco Co. case where the Norwegian Control Council licensed a boycott of an American-
British enterprise. [1928] 12 TRUSTKONTROLLEN, Decision of July 5, 1928.
80. A Berlin concern under the control of International Telephone and Telegraph
Company.
81. Namely, Allgemeine Elektrizitaetsgesellschaft.
82. See Frankfurter Zeitung, March 18, 1931, p. 10, col. 4.
83. KARTELL VERORDNUNG, supra note 39.
84. The grant of a license to boycott Philips, G.m.b.H., if exploited, would have clearly
terminated the balance of power between the two radio empires. Despite the hope of leading
commercial papers (especially the Frankfurter Zeitung) that decisive results would follow
from the Cartel Court decision, the continuance of the old balance seems to indicate that
the parties had reached a compromise.
85. Notwithstanding the resistance of the Cartel Court, it was inevitable that such
power was eventually put to political uses. See Decision of Nov. 22, 1935 (Germany, March
11, 1936) 12 E. UND G., Decision No. 372; Kronstein, The Dynamics of German Cartels and
Patents 11 (1942) 10 U. OF Cm. L. REv. 50; infra section on Totalitarian Economy, p. 328.
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to engaging in certain fields of commerce,"s what persons were entitled
to engage simultaneously in both wholesale and retail trade,57 who was
entitled to be a producer and who a wholesaler.E-3 Yet nothing in this
development may be regarded as unlooked for, given the premise of a
"good cartel" whose interests are deemed identical with those of the
public. It does not then appear illogical to permit such organizations
to set the minimum standards of business nor to encourage an enlarge-
ment of their membership.
Power to dissolve cartels. By the decree of November 1923, the
Reichswirtschaftsminister was authorized, in addition to issuing li-
censes, to dissolve cartels altogether upon petition and to annul any
part of a cartel agreement, subject to review by the cartel court.P But
all the eight dissolution cases filed with the Reichsirtschaftsminister
between November 1923 and October 1926 ' terminated in com-
promise, including two cases dealing with proposed annulment of
certain business practices which the defendant cartel had, advocated."
Moreover, in the years of economic depression that folloved, German
reports showed no instance in which a cartel had been dissolved under
the decree, nor in which even a specific provision of a cartel agreement
had been abrogated. 2 The amendment of the decree in 1932 03 to
permit the Reichswirtschaftsminister to exercise control without
reference to the Cartel Court, failed to improve the situation, though
it is reasonable to suppose that many cases now without tribunal hear-
ing went unreported. Yet what published decisions there are, together
with the available decisions of other countries,"1 would seem to indicate
a weak administrative policy. Despite the repeated claim that govern-
ments secretly exercised a determinative influence over cartels through
contact with personnel 95 and despite the claim of the Reichswirtschafts-
86. See KARTELLRECHT413.
87. Decision of Nov. 10,1924, (1924) 22 KArnu..-Ru1DscnAu 407.
88. Decision of July 24, 1925, (1925) 23 KARTELL-RmDsCIIAU 434; see also as to the
sufficient "reliability" of persons or firms engaged in trade, Decision of Jan. 30, 1931, (1931)
29 KARTELL-RUNDSCmAu 278.
89. See KARTELL VERORDNUNG, supra note 39, Section 4 (Dissolution of Cartels).
90. See 21-24 KARTELL-RuNDSCHAU (1923)-(1926).
91. Of the latter, one concerned cartel-dictated sales terms whereby the seller was re-
lieved of liability in event of failure to deliver goods ithin a specified time. See GOLDDAw-,
DrE NEUE KARTELLVERORDNUNG (1930) 169. The other, a gold clause case rezulted in a
compromise owing to termination in 1927 of the inflationary period upon which had been
based the cartel's insistance on preservation of the disputed clause.
92. See 25-31 KARTELL-RUhDsCHATu (1927)-(1933).
93. KARTELL VERORDNUIG, § 9, Par. 4, as amended June 14, 1932 [1932] REICHS-
GESETzBLATT 1, 289.
94. See supra note 59, at 77; Kelemen, ixe Kriih des tngarisdien Karldigeselces (1933)
31 KARTELL-RuNDSCHAU 184.
95. See statement by Dr. Curtius, before the Reichstag in 1927 (348th meeting). Par-
liamentary Reports, Dec. 2, 1927.
1946]
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
minister in 1928 that he had handled four thousand cases since 1923,0
administrative agencies in Germany continued to be subject to pressure
by powerful commercial groups. Thus, the Frankfurter Zeitunlg re-
ported in 19311o that in order to obtain a wage reduction the Rheinisch-
Westfaelische Kohlen Syndikat threatened to block extension of the
cartel, notwithstanding government insistence upon the desirability of
the latter as a means of protecting small concerns from sudden lowering
of prices; and that these small concerns themselves urged the govern-
ment to concede in the matter of wages, if only to preserve the cartel
for their benefit.
Power to permit membership withdrawal. Closely allied to the power
to dissolve cartels was the power to permit termination of cartel mem-
bership; for clearly if a sufficient number of members were authorized
to cancel their cartel obligations, the cartel agreement itself must fall.
The numerous examples of commercial pressure did not seem to dis-
suade European legislatures from supporting, in theory at least, a
system whereby the individual was expected to seek this authorization
in his own protection, and by so doing assume the role of prosecutor in
the public interest, though the government itself had failed in that
role. Such was the system governing cartel membership cancellations
established by Yugoslavian and German law. If the terms of member-
ship proved unsatisfactory, under the former law 98 cancellation was
procurable by application to the ordinary courts. In Germany such
withdrawal was in order if "economic freedom . . . [was] unreasonably
restricted." 11 But so much did the German law regard the individual
or corporate member of a cartel the vindicator of the public welfare,
and therefore a government representative, that actions of this type,
meeting opposition from cartel management, were tried not before
ordinary courts but before the Cartel Court, as if the dispute had
arisen in connection with licensing or other governmental regulatory
devices. Once a member came before the Cartel Court, however, the
familiar pattern was repeated. Only three months after its creation
96. See comments by Isay in (1928) 2 VERHANDLUNGEN DES FUENFUNDDREISSIGSTEN
DEUTSCHEN JURISTENTAGES 708, 730.
97. Frankfurter Zeitungof Jan. 25, 1931, p. 5, col. 1; id. Feb. 18, 1931, p. 5, col. 1.
98. See Decree Concerning Cartels August 3, 1934, Section 15(2) [19341 A. Z. No. 190.
99. KARTELL VERORDNUNG, § 8 provides: "Agreements or resolutions covered by
Section 1 can be terminated by each participating person without notice whenever substan-
tial cause exists.
"It shall be considered substantial cause whenever the economic freedom of the person
terminating the agreement or the resolution is unreasonably restricted, especially as far as,
production, marketing or prices are concerned.
"In case of litigation the Cartel Court, on motion of one of the participating persons,
shall decide whether the termination was permissible. The motion must be filed within 0.
period of two weeks after the termination has been served. If the motion is not filed withilr
this period of time the termination is considered as in effect." See supra note 39.
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the court declared I'l that withdrawal from membership was not to be
based merely upon a general decline in economic conditions; termina-
tion would not be permitted unless the cartel was itself responsible for
such deterioration or unless the economic crisis did not equally affect
all members.' 0' Even without this special discouragement, withdrawal
by a member was always a matter of some difficulty since cartels
exacted extreme loyalty from their members. The Cartel Court %,ith-
drawal rule, therefore, could not fail to impose a certain moral as well as
economic sanction on those who sought to betray this primary alle-
giance; even the flexible character of cartel organization could not
diffuse or dissipate such loyalty, nor weaken the resistance to economic
change.
In its decision of May 17, 1924,12 the Cartel Court advanced still
another prerequisite to membership withdrawal: "Since the cartel
member objecting to the cartel price as too high, did not allege that
the prices are unethically high, and since the court did not find any
violation of good ethics, no right of a member to cancel his membership
can be recognized." 103 By this appeal to "good ethics" as a standard
of price, the court failed toprevent price-fixing and a "frozen" member-
ship from continuing to hinder a healthy adjustment of prices to
changing conditions. With cancellation forbidden and cartel members
themselves unable to question prices, no one had standing to do so.
The Cartel Court, reluctant to find good cause for membership
termination in matters touching external relations of cartels, was more
readily inclined to permit withdrawal for causes originating within the
structure of the cartel itself. Typical factual conditions recognized as
"good cause" included: (1) failure of cartel management to enforce
discipline equally against all members of the cartel; "1 (2) excessive
disciplinary measures; 10 (3) unreasonable membership dues; IcZ (4)
violation by management of equal treatment rule without authoriza-
tion by the original cartel contract; 1 (5) violation by a member, of
special privileges allowed under original contract.' Yet even with the
aid of these criteria cancellation suits frequently ended not in termina-
100. Decision of February 25, 1924 (1924) 22 IARTELL RutmsC=Au 92.
101. Id. at 97. The Cartel Court further stated: "Cartel members who under favorable
economic conditions reap substantial advantages from their membership shall not use an
unfavorable economic development as an excuse for cancellation of the cartel agreement."
102. (1924) 22 KARTELL-RuNDScmHU 265.
103. Id. at 267-8.
104. See e.g. Decision of Jan. 31, 1928, (1928) 26 KARTELL-RmDSCMUu 147.
105. Decision of Cartel Court, February 4, 1924, (1924) 1 E. unn G., Decision No. 5.
106. Decision of Oct. 22, 1926, (1926) 24 IQLRTELL-RUmDsCHAU 593.
107. Decision of Cartel Court, Nov. 11, 1924 (Germany, January 20, 1925), 1 E. inm G.,
Decision No. 38.
108. Decision of Cartel Court, July 14, 1936, (Germany, October 31, 1936) 13 E. n.ND G.,
Decision No. 394.
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tion but in buying off the aggrieved party; and good cause was more
often founded upon personal animosity than upon economic neces-
sity.19 A score of cases indulging in blackmail of this type can have
accomplished little in behalf of public protection.110
Membership withdrawal and, as a consequence, cartel termination by
individuals at length lost all significance due to the Cartel Court's
predisposition to enforce strictly the "equal treatment of members"
rule. This may be illustrated by the fact that once certain members of
an industry were ordered by the Court to join a cartel, this compulsory
affiliation extended to voluntary members as well, in that no one was
permitted to withdraw."1 And this restriction was not a substitute for,
but supplementary to, the bulwark against withdrawal previously
discussed. Redress was even further debarred by the rule that members
could apply to administrative agencies only after exhausting the
remedies provided by cartel by-laws." 2
Reliance on the individual as the champion of public rights would
seem therefore to have proved unwise. His meagre success is hardly
unexpected, for it appears to have come about through a confused
combination (not wholly untypical of the control system) of unfor-
mulated ideas as to what comprises the public interest, with a mistaken
interpretation and application of one facet of the liberal economic
philosophy. The basic tenet of the latter, and it bears repeating, is.
faith in an economic order in which every individual is free to act under
economic conditions affording equal opportunity. But to preserve this.
freedom the utmost vigilance on the part of government is necessary.
Assigning the task of preservation to the individual alone is destructive
109. See Testimony of Expert Witnesses before the Enquite Committee in 1930. Vni,-
HANDLUNGEN UND BERXCHTE DES UNTERAUSSCHUSSES FUER ALLGEmE.NE WIRTSCAFTS-
STRUKTUR, AusscHuss ZUR UNTERSUCHUNG DER ERZEUGUNGS UND ABSATZBEDINGUNGEN
DER DEUTSCHEN WIRTSCHAFT, 1st Sub-Committee, 3rd Working Group, pt. 4, second section,
(1930) (hereinafter cited UNTEIAUSSCHUSSES FUER ALLGEMEINE WIRSCHAFTSSTRUKTUR)
passim.
110. Id.at63elseg.
111. Decision of Cartel Court, March 28, 1935 (Germany, May 29, 1935) 12 E. UND G.,
Decision No. 320.
112. Ibid. For example, where a member complained of a shift in the balance of power
within the cartel, resulting from re-allocation of quotas to non-members, the Cartel Court
refused termination partly on the ground that the "plaintiff [had] not used all available
remedies," which included, according to the cartel by-laws, a judicial proceeding.
Apart from the question of withdrawal the sharp effect of this "exhaustion of remedies"
principle (derived from the law of associations) becomes clear when it is understood that
cartel draftsmen were in a favorable position to assure exclusion not only of administrative
remedies but resort to the courts as well; fedress was made contingent upon arbitration,
and arbitration in turn by its devious methods of enforcement could preclude judicial appeal
from tribunal awards. So it might happen that a cartel member could have no recourse at
all in the event of an unfair arbitration decision. See infra p. 318. Compare Decision of
Oct. 22, 1914, (1914) 85 R. G. Z. 355; Decision of Amtsgericht, Berlin, June 6, 1936, (1936),
34 KARTELL-RUNDScHAU 654.
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to the faith, since he may or may not, at his discretion, seek the rem-
edies necessary to effect such preservation. And more particularly is
this so where primary loyalties are not in the interests of society, but
are procurable at a price by the very organizations which the individual
is called upon to resist. It is paradoxical perhaps to complain in this
instance of too much individual discretion, yet it is not a question of
refusing such discretion to an individual but of insisting that the latter
is too weak an instrument for adequate protection of the public. The
fact remains that under the system of control, discretion is not discre-
tion in the true sense, but merely a name for an occasion of choice
which the pressure of strong groups has destroyed. Under the system
of free competition contemplated by the liberal economic philosophy
such pressure is an anathema, and choice and discretion are freely exer-
cisable with but one proviso: that they shall not endanger the free
contractual relation, nor disturb the natural effects of supply and
demand.
JUDICIAL "CONTROL'
Despite the assignment to administrative authority of so large a
segment of control, the civil courts, particularly the German Reichs-
gericht, remained free to entertain cases arising under two general
classifications: suits involving (1) internal relations between cartels
and cartel members or between combines and members of combines;
(2) external relations between cartels or combines and any individual or
corporate entity with which a monopolistic enterprise might come in
contact. The essence of jurisdiction was that governments themselves
through their regulatory agencies were not directly involved. And
although the advent of these same agencies had radically reduced the
scope of civil jurisdiction, the courts within this narrowed sphere con-
tinued as before to profess a policy of control.
I. INTERNAL RELTI NS
Cartels. It is a matter for speculation as to whether judicial regula-
tion would have proved a greater success had it not been for the predi-
lection of cartels for arbitration. Events lent substance to the prophecy
of Franz Klein 113 that judicial supervision of internal cartel relations
would diminish as recourse to private arbitration increased. Settle-
ment of disputes between members by this extra-legal means brought
about the creation of a system of private tribunals, the aim of which
was less the protection of individual members than the preservation of
113. See Klein [1902] 3 VERHANDLUNGEN DES SECUSUNDZWANZIGSTEN DEU" CHEN
JuRiSTENTAGES 299; KLEIN, VORLESUNGEN UEBER DIE PR.XS DES CIVIL'NROCESSMs (1900)
13-16.
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power in the hands of cartel management. 114 Through the exercise of
almost wholly unsupervised power, tribunals imposed fines, allowed
damages, and even decreed exclusion of members from cartels. Al-
though aggrieved members had at their disposal several means of
combatting unjust arbitral awards," 5 these proved ineffective as the
few cases fortunate enough to reach the courts have shown.110 The
inequitable character of awards may be traced to not infrequent
partiality of tribunals, a weakness hardly surprising where arbitrators
themselves have had official connection with cartels involved in the
proceedings. In 1938, the German Kammergericht 17 denied recovery
to a defendant who had been "indicted" before a tribunal by a cartel
management corporation for underselling the established cartel price.
Notwithstanding the defense that the corporation had unlawfully
appointed as tribunal judge a member of its own board, and that the
same member representing his corporation had himself negotiated with
the defendant in connection with the now questioned price scheme, the
court found the tribunal personnel entirely competent. Admittedly
the task of determining the degree of interest necessary to require
exclusion of a tribunal judge is considerable, but English as well as
German courts have shown little hesitation in approving for such
posts the appointment of trade association members and other in-
terested parties."'
Judicially unsupervised arbitration has also promoted to a certain
extent injustices arising from its compulsory nature. And this has
proved particularly unpalatable in Germany in conjunction with the
administrative power of the Reichswirtschaftsminister to compel busi-
ness concerns to join cartels."' In the decision of November 22, 1937,
the Reichsgericht 120 rejected the plea of a cartel member who claimed
114. For discussion see Kronstein, Business Arbitration-Instrument of Private Govern-
ment (1944) 54 YALE L. J. 36. Pursuant to statutory authority, clauses providing for arbl-
tration of disputes were frequently made part of the cartel agreement.
115. Among these are the following:
1) Filing objections in the civil courts (a) with reference to personal competence of
arbitrators, particularly where the latter have been appointed by cartel management- (b)
against petitions to declare arbitration tribunal awards judicially enforceable;
2) Requesting the civil courts (a) to pass upon the validity or invalidity of the arbitra-
tion clause (before action by the tribunal), regardless of the validity of the agreement to
regulate markets; (b) to determine that an award already yendered by a tribunal is without
effect. See Cohn, Commercial Arbitration and the Rules of Law-A Comparative Study (1941)
4 U. or TORONTO L. J. 1.
116. See Kronstein, supra note 114, passim.
117. Decision of February 4, 1938, (1938) 36 KARTELL-RUNDScnAU 416.
118. See E. E. S. Brian Smith, Ltd., v. Wheatsheaf Mills, Ltd., [1939] 2 K. B. 302; and
Decision of Feb. 4, 1938 (Kammergericht), (1938) 36 KARTELL-RuNDSCUAU 416,417.
119. See amendment of the Kartell Verordnung by decree of July 15, 1933 (1933) Ru-icus.
GESETZBLATT I, 487.
120. (1937) 35 KART.L-RuNDscriu 137.
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that although compelled by administrative decree to join a cartel, he
was not similarly compelled to submit to arbitration. Denial of re-
course to courts under such circumstances thus strengthened the posi-
tion of tribunals as a type of extraordinary court.
Moreover, self-enforcement of tribunal awards by threat of exclu-
sion, so intimidated cartel members generally that even the procedural
right of appeal from awards on the ground of improper hearing or in-
consistency with substantive law 121 were seldom resorted to. -2 An
Oberlandesgericht Muenchen decision 123 is illustrative of the few
appeal cases extant. Ordered by a tribunal to pay a contractual fine for
violation of cartel established-prices, a cartel member objected that
compliance with the award was impossible without contravening the
provisions of a price statute. Yet the court affirmed the tribunal
decision on the technical ground that while the tribunal undoubtedly
had knowledge of the statutory prohibitions, its findings failed to state
the existence of any discrepancy between the award and the law, and
that consequently it was not possible to discover whether the decision
was or was not affected by knowledge of such discrepancy. The basis
for sustaining the pronouncement of the tribunal appears to have been
the importance of safeguarding its prestige, as was shown in a later
case 124 which approved an award for fines though no fault was found
in the defendant member.
To the same end the Reichsgericht did not find cause to reverse even
a tribunal decision unfavorable to a cartel management which had
professed a liberal and public-spirited position. The wire association
cartel, one of the largest in Germany, was involved in a case having to
do with assignment of production quotas.12 3 Prior to the creation of
the cartel, a firm which subsequently became a member had, in deroga-
tion of the association charter as finally approved, purchased the entire
production quota of a competitor.'2- Notwvithstanding the cartel
management's insistence that the purpose of modem cartels was to
enlarge rather than to curtail production and that a quota assignment
requiring the closing of plants served only to restrict production, the
Reichsgericht affirmed the tribunal award against the management,
121. Under certain of the European codes of Civil procedure an appeal from awards of
arbitration tribunals to the civil courts is permitted on these grounds. See e.g. France and
Belgium: CODE DE PRoc. Civ. §§ 1023-1028; Suter, Der Schiedsrertrag rach schwedirishe
Zivilprozessrecht (1928) 47 ZEITSCHRIn FOER SCRWEIZERISCMIS RECaT 8, at 45, n. 140;
Cohn, Commercial Arbitration and the Rules of Law-A Comparalire Study (1941) 4 U. o-
ToRoNro L. J. 1, 4-5.
122. Kronstein, supra note 114.
123. Decision of February 13, 1939. (1939) 37 KARTF-RunDs Au 238S.
124. Decision of Sept. 15, 1939. (1940)38 KARnmEL-RU.MsCHIAu212.
125. Decision of the Reichsgericht, March 24, 1936. (1936) 12 HOECMSTnIirnznLxCuE
RECEETSPRECHUNG, No. 910.
126. The charter, however, approved purchase of quotas from members.
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with the observation that the general trend of cartels and the quota
system being in thie direction of restriction, the tribunal could not be
held in error for having concluded that this cartel was moved by the
same considerations.
Although judicial cases involving tribunal decisions were remarkably
few, the cases not preceded by awards were even fewer. The brief
glimpse afforded by German reports reveals the same supremacy of
cartel management at the expense of members and of the public gen-
erally. The Reichsgericht decision of February 21, 1933,127 illustrates
the lengths to which purposeful confusion of the public was carried. A
cartel member had been charged with underselling the cartel price, the
plaintiff management objecting that the lower price, in so far as it af-
fected other members of the cartel, amounted to "unfair competition."
The evil in this, in the opinion of the court, rested in the fact that the
public might be led erroneously to believe that the low priced member
was the most efficient. And to prevent such an outcome judgment was
given in favor of the plaintiff. The standard of "unfair competition"
employed here, as pointed out by Franz Boehm, was not one to protect
the principles of a liberal economy, but rather to oppose any step which
might be contrary to prevailing business attitudes; "2 indeed, stat-
utes 19 created for the purpose of curbing unfair competition had
gradually come to perpetrate it.
It may not be denied, however, that under like circumstances cartel
members occasionally met with success. In one instance a cartel
member successfully pressed his claim before the Landesgericht Muen-
chen, 13° declaring he had been discriminated against in the matter of
cartel dues. The court ruling in his favor held that he had been un-
/ lawfully charged 100 R.M. in excess of the customary annual sum
levied upon members of equal standing; that such disparity in treat-
ment by cartel management directive could not be tolerated, except
by express direction of the cartel charter itself. Despite this instance,
however, and despite professed adherence to the ideal of control, the
courts made little headway. And the advent of the administrative
agency, by removal of some of the weight of responsibility, seems to
have accelerated rather than retarded the rapidity with which the
courts undermined what little there remained of the liberal economic
system.
Combines. The fact that administrative control of combines, unlike
127. (1933) 31 KARTELL-RuNDSCHmAU 289.
128. For discussion of the relation between the law of cartels and of unfair competition
see BoEm, WETTBEWERB UND MONOPOLXAMPF (1933) 124 et ser.; CALLMANN, DER uN-
LAUTERE WETTBEWERB (1932) 105-06.
129. See Reichgesetz gegen den unlauteren Wettbewerb, June 7, 1909 [1909] R-iCns-
GESETZBLATT I, 499.
130. 156 R.'G. Z. 101 (Nov. 2, 1937); (1938) 36 KARTELL-RUNDscHAU 560.
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the control of cartels, met with but slight practical application,1'3 left
more unreservedly to the courts the supervision of internal relations
between combine members. In Germany, the decree of 1923 had little
effect upon the continuous combine development begun at the turn
of the century. 3 2 At the outset, the power of management was some-
what less arrogantly felt than was the case with cartels. This was due
perhaps to the more vigorous preservation in a combine of the in-
dividual legal entities. In the horizontal structure of a cartel, the
individuality of its components is lost in the singleness of purpose of
the cartel agreement, while in the looser vertical structure of a combine,
members continue to operate with comparative freedom within a given
field and without loss of corporate, partnership or other legal identity;
as a result, their effectiveness in court is not completely lost.
Whatever the cause, judicial attitude toward internal combine
disputes was generally strict some tventy-five years ago, encouraging
the application of the several weapons of defense which combine mem-
bers had at their disposal. The chief among these was the minority
stockholders' suit, which not only protected, as it governed, the
corporate acts of members, but served also as a channel through which
the public interest itself might be represented. Before the excessive
concentration of German economic power, an additional weapon was
the rule that one corporation could not assume preponderant control
over another. Pursuant to this rule, the Reichsgericht 3 declared void
a contract between Standard Oil Company and Deutsche Petroleum
Verkaufsgesellschaft, according to which the former, in consideration
of an annual guaranteed profit of twenty per cent, took over all sales.
transactions of the German firm. In the view of this opinion, a corpora-
tion might dissolve itself, but as long as it existed it could not relinquish
its individual freedom to do business. Although no mention was made
of monopoly, it was doubtless an issue in the minds of the judges in
the case, for petroleum monopoly was a crucial question before the
legislature at the time the decision was made. 13 4 Had the principle
here asserted survived sufficiently to influence the subsequent develop-
ment of economic concentration, the pattern so clearly traceable in the
realm of cartels might not have found its companion in the realm of
combines. The "emasculation *theory," however, rather than its.
opposite enunciated in the Standard Oil case, soon became the rule and
the courts could not or would not check its wide acceptance. Events
directed the emerging law in a fashion which courts, confronted with
single specific cases, could not have been expected to foresee; they
could not have foreseen that control of one corporation by another,
131. See supra note 55.
132. See supra p. 304 and note 39.
133. Decision of May 27, 1913, (1913) 82 R. G. Z. 30S; see Hoeniger InrengesdLf csL
und Inmnsyndikat (1921) 84 ZErrscmuHRT FUER DAS GESAlI-n HANDELS-UND KoNMrLus-
anc, 459.
134. See DRUCKSACHEN DES REICHSTAG (1912).
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once recognized, would in the end affect other questions of law relating
to the internal structure of combines, including the power of minority
stockholders to resist dominance by corporate combine management.
The Reichsgericht, indeed, had already indicated in the Hibernia
case 131 its predisposition towards the interests of combine manage-
ment as against minority shareholders, although the effect of this deci-
sion may have been mitigated by the Prussian government's ownership
of the majority shares, a fact tending to obscure the issue of public
interest. The minority shareholders had protested the actions of the
majority and of the management of the Hibernia Corporation in
bringing about itE union, as a subsidiary, with a large industrial com-
bine. The Reichsgericht gave judgment in favor of the majority, but
not without observing that the minority shareholders' endeavor to
preserve the separate earning capacity of a successful and long prof-
itable enterprise was eminently justified. Nevertheless, the court felt
that in the ensuing dispute between majority and minority interests
"the majority [was] perfectly entitled, when successful in its struggle,
to utilize its property for purposes it considered the most impor-
tant." "I In relinquishing in this way complete control to the majority
interests, the court appears not to have considered the logical conse-
quence: that where such unbridled power is, through majority shares,
ultimately centered in the hands of combine management, the man-
agement should be obliged to furnish the same measure of respect
for the economic interests of the corporations over which it presides,
as may be claimed for the protected property right of an individual.
But combine management succeeded in evading these obligations
largely by shrouding its activities in secrecy and preventing share-
holder and public alike from learning the details of its plans. The
Reichsgericht declared in the Goodhard case," 7 that the management
of a parent corporation is not bound to answer questions relating to
the commercial enterprises of subsidiaries; the subsidiary, although
its shares are owned by the parent corporation, remains an independent
entity.' In due course a rationale in support of decisions so ad-
vantageous to management was produced. The courts readily adopted
the dictum of Rathenau: "I that combine management must be pro-
tected against interference by minorit3f shareholders for the reason that
large business associations, upon which the fortunes of countless em-
ployees and consumers depend, have themselves come to be the true
depository of the public interest. 40
135. (1908) 68 R. G. Z. 317.
136. Ibid.
137. (1927) 115 R. G. Z. 332.
138. See id. at 338-9.
139. RATnENAU, VON KOumENDEN DiNGEN (1917) 142 el seq.
140. See also HAUSSMANN, VoM AKTIENWESEN UND VOM AxTIENRECHT (1928); BER.u
AND MEANS, TnE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY (1940).
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II. EXTERNAL RELATIONS
Cartels. The relations of cartels with the public in general are the
test of monopoly control, for there the issues are most plain and the
power or weakness of the courts most fully revealed.
In a larger measure than was necessary in the case of internal dis-
putes, the courts in Germany had to relinquish their authority to
administrative bodies, so numerous were the cases involving licensing
or other features of public law exclusively within administrative juris-
diction. Nevertheless, a few external relationship cases appeared in
the courts after 1923. These exhibited the customary distinction
between good and bad cartels, the hallmark of judicial weakness.
Disputes centered around building construction bids, in connection
with which the concerns or agencies issuing invitations for bids charged
bidders with cartel conspiracies. That the Reichsgericht's view was as
consistent in external matters as it had been in internal affairs is
shown by the decision of December 6, 1935: 141
"If any understanding betwreen bidders has no other aim but to
protect the parties against a form of competition which may
threaten the character of bids for public works, against reckless
underbidding, it does not lead to harmful price increase and is to be
considered lawful." 142
More often, however, European courts had to deal wsith questions
of legality or illegality of specific cartel measures against non-members.
In 1936, the Swiss Bundesgericht 1-1 approved a tobacco merchants'
association boycott aimed at compelling the plaintiff to join the car-
tel. 44 The court drew a somewhat tenuous distinction between com-
pulsion for destructive purposes and compulsion as a means of inducing
"coperation": it was not the intention of the association to destroy
the plaintiff by boycott, but to induce it to co5perate with the cartel
in "improving" the price conditions of the retail trade, an unques-
tionably legal objective. The opinion states:
"The aims of the association were of such high standard that
the sacrifice which the plaintiff may have been called upon to
make, as a result of measures taken by the association against
141. (1936) 7 HOECHSTRICHTERLICHE REcassPRECHUNG No. 457.
142. Ibid.
143. Schweiger-Hauser gegen Schweiz. Tabakverband (Feb. 12, 1936), [1936] B. G. E.
11, 97, 104-107.
144. It should be noted that under the Swiss law, boycott approval came under the
jurisdiction of the civil courts, and was not, as in Germany, subject to license by administra-
tive agency. On Swiss cartel law, see BURzy, DE LA HARPE, ALEMNAGE, LA Suissc E-T
L'AUTARCrE (1939); HEusER, CONTROL OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE (1939).
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him, is certainly not unreasonable compared with the importance
of the ends of the association." 145
To the same effect was a subsequent decision IG in which both the
public's and the cartel's aim in market regulation was declared identi-
cal, and refusal to cooperate was therefore held hostile to public in-
terest. Those willing to cotperate thus became the prodigals and in-
dividualism characteristic of the liberal economy commanded no pro-
tection under Swiss law.
Some realization of the direction in which such decisions would
ultimately lead-for these Swiss cases were typical 147-is to be found
in French 4I and Gerinan 141 decisions following the great crisis of 1929.
In the Duesseldorf filling station case,15 0 for example, a German na-
tional gasoline cartel, after fixing the wholesale prices for filling station
sales, was confronted by a station owner (supplied by a cartel member)
who found it more profitable to undersell the cartel price. In retaliation
the cartel instructed all local stations to undersell the offender. But
the latter sought judicial redress and secured the desired protection
through a decision which represents one of the last judicial protests
against "the brutal will to destroy." "I More especially, the decision
attempted to designate "unfair" not as a preordained standard set
up by cartels, but as a name to be applied to any activity directed
toward interference with free competition. Nevertheless, the case was
only sporadic in its effect, and failed to prevent the two Swiss Bundes-
145. See supra note 143.
146. Berner Schachtelkisefabrik A. G. und Fromagerie Le Castel, S.A., gegen Schweiz-
erische Kdseunion (Oct. 6, 1936) [1936] B. G. E. H, 276, 280-1.
147. Compare Decision of the Reichsgericht, February 21, 1933, (1933) 31 KARTELL-
RuNDscHAu 289.
148. See Ami du Peuple, Cour de Paris, April 9, 1930, [1930] GAZ. PAL. I, 928; Decision
-of February 7, 1934, cour de Lyon [1936] GAz. PAL. 1, 862.
149. Decision of Oberlandesgericht, Cologne, February 1, 1935 (1935) 33 KAItrELL-
RuNnscHAu 824.
150. Decision of Dec. 18, 1931 (1932) 134 R. G. Z. 342. See Isay, Der Vernichitingszwcdk
im Wellbewerb (1929) Zn-TscHRIF FUR GEWERBLICHER REcnTsscHuTz UND URnarERRE CuT
1369 et seg.
151. A fuller statement by the Court of Appeal in Duesseldorf reads: "The defendants,
by their superior financial means, may undersell the plaintiff for quite some time, They
intended to destroy the economic position of the independent plaintiff, to get an absolute
monopoly throughout the country anid to dominate the market without any restriction.
These activities are irreconcilable with the principles of competition established by law. The
whole character of the activities of the defendants is inconsistent with principles of good
ethics and therefore 'unfair.' The methods of the defendants are dictated by the will to
destroy. The brutal will to destroy makes the underselling an unlawful method. The un-
ethical aim governs the behavior of the defendants to such an extent that each of the means
utilized by them becomes immoral." [1930] Juristische Wechenschrift 1746, Cf. Court of
Appeals as quoted in the Reichsgericht's affirming opinion, Decision of Dec. 18, 1931, (1931)
134 R. G. Z. 342.
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gericht decisions from underwriting those precedents previously dis-
cussed, in which failure of a cartel member to sustain the cartel price
was deemed "unfair competition."
Combines. With respect to the external relations of combines little
need be added to the evils already described in connection with cartels.
The deterioration of conditions suitable to free, uncoerced, contractual
relations would not appear to need further emphasis. Yet so unequal
did these relations between combines and the general public become
that in Germany courts went so far as to suggest, by way of dicta, that
to insure individual protection against monopolistic power, the courts
themselves would dictate the pertinent contract terms. 2 But even
though this suggestion was based soundly upon the general principle
that courts were empowered to allow damages in the protection of
persons harmed by the intentional "unethical act" of another," its
merits were never put to the proof, since consumers and consumer
organizations alike were in too great fear of combine power.
'THE CARTEL REGISTER
Distinct from, yet supplementary to administrative and judicial
control was the cartel register. Compilation of information relating to
a variety of commercial agreements was early seen to have bearing on
the degree of efficiency with which regulation or even prohibition could
be accomplished. As early as 1897, and prior to the abandonment of
the prohibition policy by Austria, a bill was introduced I4 which
sought to create a register open to public, as well as to government in-
spection. The purpose was to elicit information helpful to the enforce-
ment of statutes which proscribed cartels as illegal. But during dis-
cussion of the first draft, industrial representatives 15 demanded in
return for submission to compulsory registration under the statute, the
assurance that all cartel agreements so registered would receive govern-
ment sanction and approval. This demand rapidly became the crucial
issue of registration throughout Europe,1 for it was clear that ac-
quiescence would lead almost certainly to the approval of what other-
wise would have warranted censure. l3 7 As Klein pointed out, if the
152. See KARTELLRECHT 199 cq seq.
153. See Buergerliches Gesetzbuch of August 18, 1896, Section 826. For discusaion, Eee
NIPPERDEY, KONT.EAERUNGSZWANG UD DIETIERTER VERTPA',G (1920) 53-61. It should be
noted in this connection that under the Civil Law specific performance is the rule and
damages the e-xception. See GERa.% CIIL CODE (Wang's trans. 1907) art. 249, § 1.
154. June 1, 1897. No. ISS of the Beilagen zu den Stenographischen Protocolle d-,
Abgeordnetenhauses. See BAUMGATNER-MESZLEM, 1IRTELLE UND Tnusrs (1906) 316.
155. See GRUNZEL, UEBER A RTELLE (1902) 190.
156. Id. at 161.
157. See e.g. Yugoslavian Statute of August 3, 1934 as amended by the decree of Novem-
ber 25, 1935. Section 2(3) provides: "Only cartel contracts, artel agreements or cartel
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purpose of registration was to dispel ignorance surrounding the func-
tion of cartels, it could not follow that approval, supposedly based on
facts revealed, was justified before those very facts were fully exam-
ined.16s
But where the legality of cartel agreements was not in issue, where
as in Norway, for example, the register served as a fact-finding aid to
administrative and judicial "control" rather than as an adjunct of
prohibition, cartel proponents were not in a position to utilize the
register to their own advantage and in consequence attacked it as an
encroachment upon liberties of industry. 9 But such an attitude was
not always consistently held. It is ironic that as long as the alternative
to control and registration was the maintenance of a status quo which
allowed cartel function without interference, cartel proponents were
opposed to either of these devices. But as soon as the alternative sug-
gested became not "control" but prohibition (as if the antitrust policy
of the United States were extended to international cartels) then the
register became favored by such men as Lord McGowan of Imperial
Chemicals, Ltd.; it was now regarded the lesser of two evils.
It was a lesser evil because it could be mitigated. Indeed, it is ques-
tionable whether it was ever an evil at all, for although the register
called for statistical compilations, not a single conviction for failure to
comply with its requirements appears to have been made or sustained
in Europe during the interval of the two wars. The reason lay not
wholly in the lack of assiduousness with which cases were prosecuted.
It lay to some extent in the same indefiniteness as to the scope of
statutory provisions which had afflicted legislative establishment of
administrative agencies. Attempts were made to set up objective
criteria for registration. Obligation to register was restricted in one
instance to agreements which effected a price increase,"'0 and in an-
other, extended to all international agreements made by specified
types of legal entities: corporations, partnerships and the like.101 But
even these criteria appear to have failed to define the scope of applica-
tion with sufficient clarity. For while it may have been possible for
understandings which are in writing and which are submitted for registration have legal
validity" (emphasis supplied). See supra notes 56 and 57.
158. Klein supra note 24 at 307, stated: "Do not forget that the request for publication
necessarily implies the recognition of the validity of the cartels, but it accomplishes nothing
in the direction of obviating the dangers of the cartel development. Legal recognition is the
most fundamental right the state can give. Shall the state grant this gift only for the purpose
of statistics. . . .One cannot say: I do not know how cartels work or whether they should
be controlled. I shall have to find that out; but nevertheless I shall recognize their validity
in advance."
159. See UNTERAUSCHUSS FUER ALLGEMEINE WITSCHATSSTRUXTUR 32 et seg.
160. See testimony of Mr. Kraetzig, UNTERAUSCHUSS FUER ALLGEMEINE VIRSTSC1AFTS-
STRUKTUR 47; voN BEcKERATH, DER MODERNE INDUSTRIALISMUS (1930) 270 et seg.
161. Testimony of Mr. Neumann, op. cit. supra note 160, at 256.
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government officials to determine the extent to which a given agree-
ment did or did not interfere with prices and general market conditions,
the single industrialist who was required to register could not tell in
advance whether a particular agreement would come within the man-
date of the statute. Moreover, as reported by a leading French legal
society, 62 lack of clear definition not only hindered efficient reporting
of cartel activities, but also left the way open to accumulation of un-
necessary and cumbersome data. Where a definition proved too gen-
eral, states the report, "Every simple understanding of a duration of
only a few days or weeks, every contract whether significant or not,
every agreement between parent corporation and subsidiary, as well as
decisions of syndicates . . . [had to] be published." 1'3 The entire
register thus tended to become burdened with information of little
practical value to the purposes of "control."
Registration statistics, as revealed by the several nations possessing
similar register statutes, would also seem to substantiate characteriza-
tion of the register as a lesser evil, since purposeful evasion appears to
have been readily accomplished. Despite the cartelization of almost
all branches of industry during the nineteen twenties, the Control
Office of Norway could report in 1931 only 192 cartel agreement regis-
trations and the registration of 51 "understandings." "I And while
official German statements revealed considerably more, three thousand
cartel agreements in 1930,163 these were hardly commensurate with
actual industrial undertakings during that period. Indeed, cartel
management seems to have forwarded successfully its own purposes
less by formal "registered" contract than by word of mouth negotiation,
and by custom designed to actuate operations independent of written
agreements. 166 This device may prove particularly successful where a
number of firms operating in the same field agree to confine their own
markets to domestic areas, thus establishing an informal international
quota system. Moreover, most private market restrictions are not
founded upon a series of specific agreements, but upon central control
of certain strategic materials by a single combine or group; the restric-
tions which flow from this authority are informal arrangements rather
than contracts.
Although registration as it developed generally in Europe served
only as a slight impediment, if any, to the perpetual unrolling of cartel
and combine power, it seems still to warrant defense as an institution.
162. Soci~t6 d'ktude LUgislatives. See supra note 46.
163. Ripert, cited supra note 46, at 259.60.
164. Andersen, Die Aufsich fber Trusts und Karldle in Norrcege (1933) 31 KAnTELL
RuNiuscELU 77.
165. See Testimony of Dr. Leidig, UNTERAusscHuss FUER ALLGE=nzz WmTsCmuni-
STRUC=TUR 58; voN BECKERTH, loc. d. supra note 160.
166. Compare Norwegian industrial licensing case, supra p. 30S.
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Conceived as a means of fact-finding and not of legalizing what was
otherwise illegal, the register could have been successfully allied,
in the interests of prohibition, with groups of government experts
organized to investigate each field of industry. Staffs employed to
examine import-export statistics, the flow of technology, and types of
foreign and domestic production, could have reduced considerably the
tendency of the register to become the collection of useless paper of
which Meinhardt complains." 7 And if to this had been added the
power of government to investigate private commercial documents,
where necessary in the public interest, a more vigorous government
policy either of control or prohibition could have been established. As
it was, government investigative authority was permitted in Ger-
many,' but information so obtained was not linked to any broader
system of research such as is suggested here, nor was it free of certain
restrictions in regard to publication.
It is in this very matter of publication and consequent publicity that
the register and the suggested system of research could serve itb most
useful purpose. Public opinion is a healthy deterrent to schemes
inimical to the public interest. An amply supply of facts would do
much to eradicate the view that the operations of cartels and combines
are mysterious.'69 In the United States, publicity might have overcome
general public apathy and misconception regarding the real nature
of pre-war international monopolies, in which a considerable part of
American industry was engaged. 7° In actual European experience,
however, registration served as a means of enhancing the power of
monopolies rather than as an aid to their control.
"CONTROL" LEADS THROUGH ANARCHY TO TOTALITARIAN ECONOMY
Notwithstanding the facts revealed in the foregoing exposition,
cartel sympathizers have not been deterred from reaching the conclu-
sion that the residuum of control still provides a more orderly economic
system than could be achieved through free competition. The protec-
tion of "good" cartels and combines, it is claimed, introduces a note of
"reason," which tends to relieve the economic chaos induced by price
variance in times of prosperity as compared with times of depres-
167. See Testimony of Dr. William Meinhardt, UNmRAUSSCHUSS FUER ALLGEMEINE
WIRTSCHAFTSSTRUKTUR 183-4.
168. See Auskunftspflichtverordnung, July 12, 1917 as amended August 11, 1918, and
by Art. 6, Par. 2 Emergency Statute of July 13, 1923, [1923] REICHSGESETZBLATT I, 723-24,
169. See STRIEDER, STUDIEN zuR GESCHICHTE KAPITALISTISCHER ORGANISATIONS-
FoRmEN (2d ed., 1925) 184 et seq., especially 188-9.
170. For European cartel connections of American firms see Hearings before the Senate
Committee on Patents on S. 2303, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. (1942) pt. 6, 2621 el seg.; Auschuss Zur
Untersuchung der Erzeugungs-und Absatzbedingungen der deutschen Wirlsehafi, Verhand-
lungen und Berichte (1930) 3 DIE DEUTSCHE CHEMISCHE INDUSRME 94.
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sion.1'71 But if the failure of control by administrative and judicial
means has not already shown this claim to be groundless, the economic
confusion resulting from that failure would itself seem to do so.
The normal ratio in Germany of goods and raw materials to prices,
for example, was disastrously dislocated. In essential products and
materials, nearly all of which were cartelized, high prices were sus-
tained, while the products of firms permitted to continue functioning
in free competition (and most of the products were non-essentials)
suffered drastic decrease in value, in one year as much as 46.34 per
cent. 1'7 2 Such disparity quickly reduced the number of those willing to
assume the risks of free enterprise, and a frozen market ensued. It is
believed in some quarters, however, that this very maintenance of
cartel prices, despite a depressed market, is an indication of cartel
success, a further example of "orderly" control.Y13 But the rejoinder is
surely: success for whom? Has it not merely served to prevent a nat-
ural adaption of price to demand and preserved a price level beyond
the pocket of the general purchaser? That is not to say that a dis-
astrous drop in prices is desirable, but only that remedy by means of
privately planned cartel schemes is illusory.
That the pre-Nazi, Bruening government in Germany was itself
not wholly deceived in this respect-though perhaps given over largely
to apathy-is shown by the decree of 1931 which declared that all
cartel prices were to be reduced ten per cent or in the alternative the
cartels were to be dissolved. 74 In the restoration of disoriented values,
little was accomplished by this means, however, as the measure was
allied with a wage decrease scheme, which prevented sufficient improve-
ment in purchasing power.'75 A single decree could not relieve a frozen
economy. Nor could a Price Commissioner, 70 appointed in the hope
171. See e.g. INTERNATIONAL LABOUR OFFICE, INTERGOVEmtNMST,%L COwQXODITY
CoNm oL AGREEmENTS, (Montreal, 1943) Introduction, xi-lviii; ee also NATiomAL ForIGN:
TRADE COUNCIL, Ixc., MEmORANDUm ON REGULATORY M1EASURES AFrECTING A!usRmcal
FoREiGN TRADE. (1944).
172. The period covered was slightly over a year, April 1930-July 1931. During the
same period cartelized prices fell only 10.40%. See Frankfurter Zeitung, July 26, 1931,
p. 5, col. 1.
173. See Haussmann and Ahearn, Misconceplions About Cartds (1945) 60 AmERICAN
MERcURY 295; Benni (and others), Rieview of 17w Economic Aspects of Saeral Inern atioral
Industrial Agreements (1930) League of Nations Publications II, Economic and Financial
No. 41, especially with reference to the European aluminum cartel, at 25.
174. See Vierte Verordnung des Reichspr.esidenten zur Sicherung von Wrtsechaft und
Finanzen and zum Schutze des inneren Friedens, Dec. 8, 1931, c. 1, § 2. 119311 R xcs-
GESETZBLATT I, 699,700; Frankfurter Zeitung, Dec. 8, 1931, p. 1, col. 3; id. Dec. 9, p. 1, col. 1.
175. Nevertheless, cartels acquiesced in the requisite decrease, though not without occa-
sional arrangements beneficial to themselves. The iron cartel went so far as to offer a fifteea
percent cut to all customers promising to buy exclusively from a given firm for a two year
period. See Frankfurter Zeitung, Dec. 15, 1931, p. 2, col. 3.
176. See Verordnung ueber die Befugnisse des Reichskommisars fuer Preisueerwachung,
Dec. 8, 1931,11931] REICHSGESrZBLATr 1, 747-3.
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that he might succeed where courts and administrative tribunals had
failed, contribute a solution. Control offices of Germany and other
countries of Europe 17 enjoyed the power to interfere with price struc-
ture at critical times, but it was seldom exercised. Rather was the
Price Commissioner expected to contrive ways of accomplishing the
aims of control, aims which the offices themselves hardly adumbrated.
It was not remarkable therefore that the Commissioner succumbed
likewise to the pressure of cartel power and was unable to break the
solidarity of inter-cartel loyalties.""8
The widespread use of sales quotas further aggravated the dis-
turbed economic conditions, particularly as it prevented the dissolution
of stock piles. In the normal unregulated economy, accumulated goods
are customarily sold out as the first step in overcoming market crises.
But through allocation of quotas cartels prevented this healthy ad-
justment, and by a consequent non-payment of interest severely cur-
tailed banking and loan activities.' And, moreover, the use of quotas
as criteria for the extension of bank credit I0 failed to induce any but
the same unsatisfactory results. Technological standards, production
capacity, and good will could thus no longer served as a basis for eval-
uating business concerns. Cartels of banks and other credit organiza-
tions restricted the flow of capital not only by high rates of interest,
but by exclusionary practices based on the degree of conformity of the
applicant to cartel'rules; one who sold more cheaply or was condemned
as an "unfair competitor" was excluded. The seriousness of these
restrictions upon business enterprise needs no emphasis.
In addition, cartels easily obtained-at the expense of domestic
"control" and without regard to national boundaries-the support of
foreign cartels and governments. In 1931, the German nitrogen syn-
dicate effectively removed the threat of a reduction of its high prices
by referring the then weak German government to the high price
policies of the Chilean government and of allied American interests
with which the Chilean nitrogen syndicate was associated.' The
same device was used by French and German iron syndicates, each
177. Germany: See KAnTmLL VERORDNUNG, supra note 39. Decree of July 15, 1933
[1933] REICHSGESETZBLATT I, 487. Bulgaria: Statute of August 15, 1936. Norway: Statute
of March 12, 1926, Gesetz betreffend Kontrolle von Konkurrenzeinschraenkungen und
Preisrnissbrauch (1926) 24 KARTELL-RuNDscnAu 133. Roumania: Statute of May 8, 1937,
Official Gazette No. 106, May 10, 1937; for German translation, see (1937) 35 Kartell-
Rundschau 385. Sweden: Statute Relating to the Study of monopolistic enterprises and
combinations, June 18, 1925, see (1936) 34 KARTELL-RUNDSCHAU 223.
178. Compare supra p. 315 and note 100.
179. See Frankfurter Zeitung daily during July and August 1931, especially August 2,
1931.
180. See [Heinrich Kronstein], Zum Problem: Slaal und Wirischaflsmachi (1929-30).
Din JusTiz 137; Frankfurter Zeitung, Oct. 7, 1931, p. 3, col. 2.
181. See Frankfurter Zeitung, February 15, 1931, p. 6, col. 1.
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group defeating the objectives of its on government by pointing to
the high prices sustained by the other.8 2 It seems hardly a product of
"reason" that could have brought about a situation in which control
offices could neither reduce prices of finished products because imports
of raw materials were subject to fixed prices, nor conversely reduce the
prices of domestically mined raw materials because the products of
foreign mines were sold at high prices in the domestic market.
So numerous indeed, were these symptoms of dislocation and eco-
nomic anarchy that governments were forced once more to take posi-
tive steps to rehabilitate the control system, which had so patently
broken down. Attempts were made first to immunize government
agencies against the influence of industry. As a means to this end, and
also as a supplement to price control, governments themselves took up
the task of quota allotment. Import quotas were established through
international agreement, principally by France,3 3 and in many cases
these adhered in content and pattern to those already established by
cartels. 3 4 In the electrical industry a similar result was accomplished
by alternative measures: the whole industry was required to join vol-
untarily by a given date a government supervised cartel, or an arbi-
trary quota system would become effective. By the former means the
French and German electrical industries cartelized the entire electrical
trade between France and Germany.'
But the passage from a negative system of control-directing what
was not to be done-to a policy of positive instructions comprising
dictated prices or compulsory government cartels, accomplished very
little more in rescuing industry from its plight.-' What direction there
was, was not based upon a clear conception of the true relation of this
or previous legislation to the public interest, nor was it based upon the
182. Id. Jan. 13, 1931, p.S.
183. See (1932) 53 ELECTROITEcmISCHE ZErrscmn 191; Izru-ATio:,Au LABOUR
OFFICE, INTERGOVEHEIUENTAL COMMODITY CONTROL AGmErr (Montreal 1943) %vi es
seg.; on tariff policies in steel, see HEXNER, THE IN TER NOAL STE L CARTEL (1943)
249-51.
184. An interesting example of the interrelations between international treaties and
cartels in the electrical equipment agreement of 1932 between France and Germany. Under
the custodianship of the two governments, the two industries established "L'Office Franco-
Allemand de Matriel ] lectrique" which executed at one and the same time the import
quota assigned to Germany by the Franco-German Commercial Treaty, and the provi ions
agreed upon by private industry. See (1932) 52 ELEcTROTECMIISCIE ZEITCHRITT 191.
185. (1932)53 ELEKTRoTEcmnscm ZErrscamT 191.
186. Of the original regulatory statutes only the Norwegian statute of March 12, 1926,
Art. 14, supra note 46, gave the government power positively to determine cartel prices and
sales conditions. The Control Office, however, appears to have used this power only for the
purpose of declaring the cartel price binding on business organizations, including thoze not
belonging to the cartel. See [1936] TRUST KONTROLLEN 45 and 101. In only one case was
there any attempt to use this power to restrict international cartels. [19371 TRUST KOi-
TROLLEN37-60.
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principles of a free economy. Instead, it was government improvisation
necessitated by the calamitous condition into which the economy had
fallen. And while governments may have desired absolute mastery of
all economic contingencies, they failed to achieve it owing to the lack of
a well-formulated goal toward which legislation could be directed. So
it was that cartels were able to perpetuate their exploitation of govern-
ment weakness, particularly in Germany. There, as was pointed out
by Boehm, 187 the government was empowered neither by the old legis-
lation nor the new to act until after the damage to public welfare had
been done; it could in no sense act in a preventive capacity.
In the light of these facts it is not surprising that in Germany, Na-
tional Socialism eventually supplied the long absent aim toward which
cartel control could be directed. Totalitarianism could hardly be ex-
pected to have adhered to the principles of free competition; its aims
were expressed in the prosecution of war, and with this the public good
was purposely identified. By such means, "control" of a perverted
sort was made effective by 1939. The rest of Europe, however, caught
in the disruption of economic trends and forced along the paths to total
war, was denied, at least for a time, a choice between the two alterna-
tives: totalitarian ideals and methods, or a free market. In the midst
of preparation for conflict the competitive scheme had to be sacrificed
temporarily. And it must now be plain that-except for the possible
suiting of a different aim to totalitarian method-there was no other
choice; that control alone, lacking in guiding principle, remained and
continues to remain an ineffectual compromise between those two.
CONCLUSION
In evaluating the lessons of European legislative and judicial prec-
edents, particularly as these may affect the United States, there is
perhaps a tendency among those trained in the common law to read
into the civil law of the Continent a sensitivity to constitutional
prerogatives and a jealous protection of individual rights which does
not exist. But although the laws of the codes and statutes may have
been intended merely as outline sketches for the courts to follow, rather
than as depositories of civil rights, and despite the reasonable deduction
that this accounts in part for the liberties which courts and adminis-
trative agencies alike have taken with the public interest, these cir-
cumstances would not seem to remove altogether a basis of comparison
between past European experience and present American problems.
The warning to the United States is of significance if only because both
the symptoms of weakened constitutional privileges and of inroads
upon the functioning of free enterprise may be already present.1M It is
187. BoEInM, WETTBEWERB UND MONOPOLKAMPF (1933).
188. See Kronstein, Business Arbitration-Instrument of Private Government (1944) 54
YALE L. J. 36.
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only with unthinking arrogance that we may say: it can't happen here.
For constitutional rights and privileges must always be viewed against
the background of the current economic fashion, as a comparison of the
Adkins SI and West Coast Hotel "I cases amply shows. And in the mold-
ing of that fashion the power of cartels and combines is undeniable.
In the past, the Supreme Court of the United States has been at
times instrumental in fostering this power. Through failure to place
constitutionally derived rights in correct relation to economic change
such decisions as Great Atlantic and Pacific Tea Company v. Cream of
T7zeat Company "I' were made possible and the evil of unequal con-
tractual relations increased. The Court ruled that a wholesale enter-
prise in a dominant and controlling position could not be compelled
to sell to an economically weak retailer, since ". . . a trader might
reject the offer of a proposing buyer for any reason that appealed to
him .... ,, 192 Though admittedly a technically just decision, it seems
an illusory one, for the bolt was drawn long after the horse had fled.
The buyer no longer stood on that equal footing which made the
"trader's" rights sacrosanct. Yet the court appears to have lost to the
buyer that privilege, while continuing to enforce a rule that presup-
posed his possession of it.
American courts have frequently shown themselves prone to follow
European example in undermining legislation designed to protect free
competition,'93 as well as in permitting expansion of judicially un-
189. Adkins v. Children's Hospital of the District of Columbia, 261 U. S. 525 (1923).
The Minimum. Wage Act of the District of Columbia, regulating the hours of wor!: for
women, was held unconstitutional as an impairment of freedom of contract under the due
process clause of the Fifth Amendment.
190. West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U. S. 379 (1937). Only fourteen years later
Chief Justice Hughes speaking for the Court expressly overruled the AdHrs case, and, in an
opinion reflecting the Holmes dissent in the latter, upheld the constitutionality of a Wash-
ington Minimum Wages for Women Act. Compare Holmes' famous dissent in Lochner v.
New York, 198 U. S. 45, 74 (1905) with the majority opinion in the same case by Justice
Peckham.
191. 227 Fed. 46 (C. C. A. 2d, 1915).
192. Id. at 49.
193. Examples of the weakening of the principle of competitive economy by court
decision are not unfamiliar to the American lawyer. In Standard Oil Co. of New Jerzey v.
United States, 221 U. S. 1 (1911), the Supreme Court interpreted the mandate for pro-
hibition in the Sherman Act, 26 STAT. 209 (1890) 15 U. S. C. § 1 (1940) as admitting limi-
tation by a "rule of reason." Even "cartelization" was permitted under special circum-
stances. According to the opinion in Appalachian Coals, Inc. v. United States, 288 U. S. 344
(1933): "Realities must dominate the judgment. The mere fact that the parties to an agree-
ment eliminate competition between themselves is not enough to condemn it. ... The
question of the application of the statute [Sherman Act] is one of intent and effect, and is not
to be determined by arbitrary assumptions. It is therefore necessary in this instance to
consider the economic conditions peculiar to the coal industry, the practices which have
obtained, the nature of defendant's plan of making sales, the reasons which led to its adop-
tion, and the probable consequences of the carrying out of that plan in relatioa to market
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supervised arbitration. 9 4 It is not insignificant perhaps that in regard
to the former, the "rule of reason" relating to trusts and combines was
adopted in the United States only twelve days after a similar rule
became the law of France. 19 5 Nor that even a cursory glance at Amer-
ican case authority "I indicates the loss of minority stockholders'
prestige through the wide acceptance of Rathenau's doctrine: the
public interest is management's interest.' It may be, indeed, that
these are indications of the passing of free competition from present-day
economic polity; that its revitalization is not possible. If this be so,
and there is by no means conclusive proof that it is, the cure of the
enormous distortion of judicial and administrative power which has
so long victimized Europe and troubled the waters in the United
States would still not seem to lie in more "control," but in a forthright
adoption of totalitarian method; in deliberate and conscious planning
for pre-determined ideals of public welfare.
But as long as the liberal economy endures its correlative would
appear to be the prohibition of cartels and combines.9 3 It may be per-
prices and other matters affecting the public interest in interstate commerce in bitumlnous
coal." Id. at 360-1. See Eldridge, The Appalachian Coal Case and the Rlde of Reason (1933)
1 GEO. WASh. L. REv. 513; Jackson and Dumbauld, Monopolies and the Court (1936) 86
U. OF PA. L. REv. 230.
194. Ironstein, supra note 188.
195. Chambre des Regu~tes de la Cour de Cassation, Decision of May 3, 1911 [19121
RECUEIL PkRIODIQUE DE JURISPRUDENCE (Dalloz) I, 33.
196. See BERLE AND MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATIONS AND PRIVATE PROPERTY
(1940).
197. Supranote 139.
198. The following excerpt from the recent opinion of Judge Learned Hand in the Alcoa
case is an excellent and dispassionate resum6 of the problem of prohibition in the United
States:
"Many people believe that possession of unchallenged economic power dead-
ens initiative, discourages thrift and depresses energy; that immunity from compe-
tition is a narcotic, and rivalry is a stimulant, to industrial progress; that the spur
of constant stress is necessary to counteract an inevitable disposition to let well
enough alone. Such people believe that competitors, versed in the craft as no
consumer can be will be quick to detect opportunities for saving and new shifts in
production, and be eager to profit by them. In any event the mere fact that a pro-
ducer, having command of the domestic market, has not been able to make more
than a "fair" profit, is no evidence that a "fair" profit could not have been made
at a lower price. . . . True, it might have been thought adequate to condemn only
those monopolies which could not show that they had exercised the highest possible
ingenuity, had adopted every possible economy, had anticipated every conceivable
improvement, stimulated every possible demand. No doubt, that would be one
way of dealing with the matter, although it would imply constant scrutiny and con-
stant supervision, such as courts are unable to provide. Be that as it may, that was
not the way that Congress chose; it did not condone "good trusts" and condemn
bad ones; it forbade all. Moreover, in so doing it was not necessarily actuated by
economic motives alone. It is possible, because of its indirect social or moral effect,
to prefer a system of small producers, each depend6nt for his success upon his own
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suasively argued that though the United States favors prohibition, the
rest of the world adheres to "control," viz., monopoly, with the result
that American commerce, if it is to be forced to conform to the pro-
fessed American policy, must suffer the harsh consequences. This
contention, though true to a certain extent, has been considerably
exaggerated through facile manipulation of opinion by industrial and
commercial interests. In promoting monopolies in Europe these in-
terests have referred repeatedly to the example of American monop-
olies, insisting that the latter are reason in themselves for continuation
of the system in Europe; while monopoly sympathizers in the United
States have conducted similar campaigns with reference to European
cartels and combines.' But more important, the argument obscures
the unquestioned fact of American power and prestige, so greatly
enhanced as a result of the war. In the face of the opportunity afforded
by such power, it is well to consider how it shall best be given expres-
sion. It should not be forgotten that in the long run the ideal aims of a
people prevail; that ideas shape the difference between one society and
another. If, then, the United States were to abandon the idea of a free
market, particularly in a time of world distress when privately planned
economies (whether "controlled" or not) establish prices beyond the
common means, American civil polity would surely seem to have lost
one of its most distinguished and traditional characteristics.
skill and character, to one in which the great mass of those engaged must accept
the direction of a few. These considerations, which v:e have suggezted only as
possible purposes of the Act, we think the decisions prove to have been in fact its
purposes." United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 14S F. (2d) 416, 427
(C. C. A. 2d, 1945).
199. A similar technique is applied to the promotion of commercial arbitration: com-
pare Sub-Commission report in INTERmATIONAL CLMUBER oF Coxs ERc, FnRST Co:;o.nss,
BRocnuRE No. 13 (1921) 15, ith GILBERT AND DICZENs, TNEC REP., E~xroar PRICEs
AND EXPORT CARTELS (XWEBB-PomERENE ASSoCLTroNs) Monograph 6 (1940) 115.
